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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the influence of socio-economic inequalities on the probability of conflict in 
Kenya and aims to synthesise various causal hypotheses in the literature. This research extends to 
a regional analysis of a cross-national sample to understand the extent to which structural 
cleavages account for a cause of potential conflict in Kenya. The post election violence that 
emerged in 2008 shed light on the urgency for policy reforms to address the root causes of 
what was viewed as an imminent outbreak of violence. Various analysts trace the origin of 
conflict to nepotism, ethnic stratification, historical injustices, poor governance and disparities in 
resource allocation. Given these sources of dissent, this study proposes that the most fundamental 
factors that considerably influence the probability of conflict in Kenya are pervasive poverty 
and extreme inequality, intensified by ethnic divisions. Based on Kuznets theory, we argue that 
the booms of economic growth experienced from 2003 perpetuated the stark economic and 
social inequalities prevalent in Kenya. As a result, there is strong evidence that suggests that 
these sharp inequalities fuelled the post-election violence and deeply influence the probability 
of conflict in Kenyan society. Another key contribution from the study is the conclusion that the 
existence of sharp horizontal inequalities result in a bias towards ethnic conflict. It is imperative 
to identify the underlying causes of conflict so as to neutralise polarisation which exacerbates 
tension and breeds further conflict. In light of this view, the probability of conflict in Kenya can 
be minimised effectively and such mitigation can be used as a mechanism for future growth and 
economic development in Kenya. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Since the advent of independence from British colonial rule in 1963, Kenya has been one of 
Africa's success stories albeit the sporadic episodes of conflict or communal violence witnessed 
over the past few decades. It has been observed that election years generally tend to be 
marred by greater incidences of social unrest and dissent. More specifically, elections in Kenya 
have been a trigger for localised violence and displacement since the introduction of multi-party 
politics in the early 1990s. The influence of political outcomes in an economy as a means for 
appropriating state resources tends to provide fertile ground for tension and conflicting interest, 
which often transforms into violent conflict. The most recent post-election violence that emerged in 
Kenya in early 2008 claimed thousands of innocent lives and left hundreds of thousands of 
individuals' homeless, the magnitude of this violence was termed the 'worst humanitarian crisis' 
since independence. In most developing countries stifled by corruption, a key driver of electoral 
success is support from regional ethnic power bases who are in turn rewarded with opportunities 
in public office and an inequitable access to national resources. 
On one hand, it has been argued that tribalism and nepotism are the roots of the deep divisions 
in Kenyan society that caused this crisis. Other scholars propose that disparities in resource 
allocation, poor governance, poverty and abrogation of responsibility by politicians and 
professionals are potential explanations for the scale of this conflict. Ethnic stratification and 
ever-threatening ethnic cleansing have further been linked to this outbreak of political conflict, 
while others attribute historical injustices as one of the immediate causes of the violence. Over 
the past decades, ethnic divisions have been invoked to mobilize individuals towards violence. 
However, there is strong evidence that suggests that conflict in Kenya stems from class divisions 
rather than ethnic divisions. On a regional level, it is found that there exist sharp economic 
inequalities which challenge the notion that structural factors such as ethnicity solely motivate 
violence in Kenya. On the whole, while polarization can occur in any type of conflict (class or 
ethnic), it has the most damaging effects in large-scale inter-group, public policy, and 
international conflicts. 
The economic outlook in Kenya has been positive during the past decade, and it is observed that 
the upsurge in economic growth occurred after a change in political regime when incumbent 
President Mwai Kibaki took office in December 2002 and implemented pro-economic growth 
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policies. Kibaki aimed towards consolidating democracy in Kenya and implementing 
appropriate redistributive reforms and policies which were geared towards boosting economic 
development. Economic theory postulates that the enhanced economic activity that development 
generates is the only way to reduce inequalities, particularly in a context of rapid demographic 
growth. In other words, it is easier to work on a fairer distribution of a growing pie than of a 
shrinking one. However, economic development itself generates a number of strains on societies 
that lie at the very roots of conflict. At least initially, economic growth tends to increase 
inequalities within a country, as some communities or individuals benefit from rising income while 
others are left behind. As individuals feel marginalized and less privileged, polarization 
between the haves and the haves-not persists which inevitably breeds conflict. 
Various sources of literature lend support to the risks of development and the violent social 
feedback from those who are left behind. While it makes intuitive sense that economic inequality 
may breed political conflict, almost no work has been done to explain such a conjunction within 
the context of Kenya. Perhaps one reason for this dearth of interest is that traditionally, a 
division based on economic gain has not been seen as a reliable predictor of political beliefs 
and partisanship in the mass public, especially in comparison to other structural factors such as 
ethnicity or region. Recent political problems that threaten to fragment Kenya require analysis 
that goes beyond ethnicity as portrayed in the media. It is therefore imperative to identify the 
roots of conflict so as to mitigate the channels for polarisation and counteract the negative effect 
of conflict for the sustainable attainment of macroeconomic objectives in Kenya. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Fundamentally, the main factors that considerably influence the likelihood of conflict since 
Kenya's independence are pervasive poverty and extreme high inequality. Although, it has 
been argued that tribal warfare and ethnic cleansing were the key contributors to the wave of 
violence that shook the Kenyan economy during and after the presidential elections at the onset 
of 2008. A historical analysis of the underlying causes of such violence reveals that the people's 
tribal identity was not the root of violence in Kenya. To better understand the roots of the post-
election violence that broke out in 2008, we revert to the preceding election year of 2002 and 
trace the origin of this conflict to sharp socio-economic inequalities, further characterised by 
ethnic salience. Incidentally, marginalised groups who were optimistic that the change of political 
regime in late 2002 would reallocate resources equitably in their favour, may have felt that five 
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years on they were still in an impoverished state and this may have infused resentment which 
translated into violence to reflect economic grievances. 
To this end, we employ a logistic regression modelling approach to explore the odds in favour 
of conflict occurring due to prevalent sharp economic inequalities, which can be further 
exacerbated by ethnic fragmentation in Kenya. Using this econometric technique, this research 
seeks to ascertain the key factors that influence the probability of conflict in Kenya. Therefore, 
the main purpose of this study is to document a strong and robust relationship between economic 
inequality and the probability of conflict, following a political transition in 2002/3 that imposed 
pro-economic growth policies. Generally, countries that exhibit stark differences in income or 
wealth distribution and disparities in resources allocation following booms in economic growth 
result in a bias towards polarization that exacerbates tension and breeds conflict. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
1.3.1 General Objective 
The key objective of the study is to fill the gap in academic literature on the influence of socio-
economic inequalities on the probability of conflict in the Kenyan context. This study further seeks 
to assess whether in the presence of such inequalities, individuals are predisposed to form ethnic 
alliances based on the hypothesis that ethnic alliances display high within-group economic 
inequality. This secondary objective allows us to document the extent to which structural factors 
such as region are viewed as valid explanations for conflict potential in Kenya. From the 
findings in this study, we aim to understand the extent to which class divisions account for a 
higher propensity of conflict in society, relative to structural causes. 
1.3.2 Specific Objectives 
In order to achieve the stated general objective the study will meet the following specific 
objectives: 
i. To assess the impact of economic inequalities on political conflict in Kenya 
ii. To document inter-regional polarization of income on the probability of conflict 
iii. To isolate the analysis of the prevalence of inequalities on a regional level and the 
relative difference to national level statistics as an influence on the probability of 
conflict 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
1.4 Research Questions 
The study will address the following questions so as to achieve at the research objectives: 
i. What is the impact of economic inequality on the probability of conflict in Kenya? 
ii. In the presence of economic inequality, is there a bias towards conflict based on ethnic 
lines? 
iii. To what extent does the prevalence of inequalities on a regional level effect the 
probability of conflict and; 
iv. On a national level, what is (are) the key attribute (s) associated with the probability of 
conflict? 
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORIES OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REDISTRIBUTION 
AND ECONOMIC MODELS OF CONFLICT. 
In this chapter, an analysis of the theoretical foundation and empirical literature supporting this 
study is undertaken. Much literature has focused on the theoretical underpinnings for explaining 
the association between economic inequality and political conflict. It is imperative to understand 
the derivations of these two concepts, as the use of varying measures to capture these constructs 
will result in differing statistical associations. As a starting point, we illuminate the definitions of 
conflict and inequality as intended in this study. Subsequently, we investigate the theoretical 
expectations of the impact of inequality on ethno-political conflict, in light of the Kuznets theory 
and shed light on empirical evidence of this relationship in other developing countries. 
Thereafter, various standard definitions and measures as used in the literature are discussed. 
The key theorists who explore the political economy of redistribution are Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2001), Esteban and Ray (2008) amongst other scholars presented in section 2.2. The 
chapter also displays a conceptual framework which is a model showing the interrelationships of 
theories highlighted in the literature review that will enable the research achieve the objective of 
the study. 
2.1 Definitions of conflict and inequality 
In this study, conflict is defined as 'political' based on supporting evidence in the literature by 
Easton (1953) who defines politics as the authoritative allocation of resources. Lasswell (1935) 
adds on that politics encapsulates 'who gets what, when and how' thereby indicating that an 
unequal allocation of resources or economic gains in countries is a major cause for political 
conflict. We shall also classify the conflict as 'ethnic' based on Horowitz (2000) definition of 
ethnic conflict as conflict along ethnic lines whereby individuals are chosen by group membership 
and mobilized towards political ends (Gurr and Harff, 1994). This classification of group 
identity is relevant to this case study which explores the salience of ethnic divide in the presence 
of economic inequalities, in explaining the probability of conflict. Incidentally, we are interested 
at understanding the conflict over the distribution and allocation of economic resources between 
regions which makes it appropriate to express it as ethno-political conflict. 
Stewart (2007) presents a number of significant dimensions of economic inequalities in her 
article on addressing inequality amongst groups where a distinction is made between horizontal 
and vertical inequalities. The former deals with inequalities that prevail between groups and the 
latter refer to individual-specific inequalities. Furthermore, Stewart (2007) breaks down the 
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elements of horizontal inequalities into economic, social, political and cultural inequalities. More 
relevant to this study are the first two dimensions which encapsulate inequalities in income, 
employment opportunities, access to a range of services such as education, health, and housing 
amongst others. Kanbur (2007) adds on that the dimensions of inequality can be decomposed 
further into a between-group and within-group component. These two components are 
elaborated upon as inequality which stems from differences of say, income relative to the mean 
of that group and the second component draws on the differences between the means across 
groups. Kanbur (2007) concludes that where conflict is perceived to be associated to actual 
differences between groups, it links to the between-group inequality and attention should be 
focused on exploring this link. 
2.2 Theoretical associations between conflict and inequality 
It is widely held in the literature that economic inequalities among groups have significant and at 
times adverse consequences, some of which cause much resentment between groups that manifest 
into violent political protest. Stewart (2007) underlines some of the repercussions of horizontal 
inequalities such as the effect on the well-being of members of deprived groups, hindering the 
full realization of economic potential, preventing efforts by policy-makers to eradicate poverty 
and an increased risk of violent conflict. Group inequalities lead to social exclusion which leaves 
the deprived group feeling marginalized on multiple levels. It is held that the evolution of 
structural attributes such as race, religion, caste, ethnicity or even region is compounded by 
economic, social, cultural, political leaders and educators who advocate for increased equality in 
the distribution of resources in their favour. Once group distinctions are defined by unequal 
access to resources, it puts to question the economic and social welfare of the marginalised 
groups. 
Lichbach (1989) provides six factors which account for increasing interest in the study of income 
and wealth distribution as a theoretically significant reasoning for political conflict and social 
unrest. Generally, conflict participants are divided into two groups: the haves versus the haves-
not. Lichbach (1989) articulates that the privileged group propagate economic inequality by 
defending the status quo distribution of resources whereas the marginalised group seek 
economic equality by attacking the status quo distribution of resources. Another factor which has 
increased popularity of this study is that economic inequality is viewed as logically associated to 
social cleavages between classes, religions, regions, genders, educational and occupational 
strata, linguistic, ethnic and communal groups. This view is supported by Kanbur (2007) who 
maintains further that economic inequality is a natural concomitant of economic processes. Muller 
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(1985) proposes two key hypotheses on the effects of income inequality on political violence. 
The first hypothesis, the relative deprivation hypothesis, states that there is a direct relationship 
between collective political violence and most forms of deprivation-induced dispute. Alesina and 
Perotti (1996) corroborate these hypotheses by expressing that socio-political instability 
increases with income inequality. 
Another important trajectory of understanding is the link between land inequality and conflict. 
Muller (1985) observes that unregulated change in the access of national resources and use in 
disputed areas are attributed as one of the causes of conflict and tribal clashes in developing 
countries. According to the resource mobilization hypothesis theorised by Muller (1985), groups 
who have unequal access and control of land resources develop strong dissenting organisations 
that can instigate political violence. Discontent arising from maldistribution of land and 
unregulated ownership is a crucial factor influencing political violence. Therefore, the 
government has a vital role to play in clearly defining property rights and regulating land 
ownership, say by issuing title documents to all individuals who have purchased or inherited land 
that has directly been allocated to them in ensuring the equitable distribution of land resources. 
In order to minimise land disputes, the government should ensure that land occupancy rights are 
enforced and protected to mitigate against severe disruptions of social relations which could 
hamper economic activity. In essence, the risk of conflict is increased when land tenure issues are 
left unresolved as the property rights of the legal owner are contested and not protected. 
On the contrary, Acemoglu et. al (2001 :953) explain that the radical redistribution of assets 
such as land through land reform programs may adversely have distortionary results because 
the elite may mount a coup to avoid such reforms. Nonetheless, the authors conclude that other 
forms of asset distribution may be used to stabilize differing regime types. In this view, Alesina 
and Drazen (1991) describe the process leading to a stabilization as a war of attrition between 
socioeconomic groups, where any delays in stabilizing an economy occur due to conflicting 
distributional objectives. 
Kanbur (2007) argues further that the implications of inequality for internal security materialize 
when unequal outcomes align with socio-political cleavages. In most economic processes, a 
trade-off between equality and equity arises in pursuit of efficiency. Lichbach (1989) highlights 
that the inequality-conflict puzzle is best resolved by applying a normative analysis and taking 
into consideration normative trade-offs that society face such as the much debated trade-off of 
efficiency for equity or inequality over conflict. However, increasingly persistent inequality may 
have a trickle-down effect on other economic phenomena such as investment, which breeds 
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disorientation in social order. When unequal outcomes arise and are integrated with the salience 
of group distinctions, this contributes further to a collapse of social order. In this view, Mogues 
and Carter (2004) explain that inequality is more destabilizing when socially embedded. 
Interestingly, the extent to which inequality is destabilizing depends on the level of economic 
growth in an economy. This link follows from Kuznets (1955) hypothesis that economic growth 
raises the incomes of skilled individuals relative to that of the unskilled which fuels greater 
inequality. In terms of Kuznets (1955) theory, a country's income inequality perpetuates and 
worsens when a country begins developing economically. After this initial drawback, these 
countries tend to experience a trickle-down effect when the rich begin investing more in the 
economy and the nation's wealth begins to disperse across divergent classes. Eventually, income 
levels equalize and people are wealthier then they would have otherwise been before the 
growth spurt emerged. Kuznets (1955) theory has been applied by major financial institutions 
such as the IMF who implement structural adjustment programs (SAP's) on heavily indebted third 
world countries which initially drastically worsen socioeconomic inequalities before this 
hypothesised trickle-down effect can be felt on a national level (Rorty, 1991). 
Lichbach (1989) examines literature which explores the links between an unequal distribution of 
wealth and the likelihood of phenomena such as revolution, civil war, terrorism, demonstrations 
and coups than those with a more equal distribution. To validate these links, major theorists of 
conflict such as Gurr (1970) and Tilly (1999) ascertain that economic inequality is at least a 
potentially important cause of dispute. Other analysts maintain that the omission of economic 
inequality as an explanatory variable in explaining conflict in most cross-national quantitative 
studies, result in major specification errors. For example, Thorbecke and Charumilind (2002) 
consider income inequality as a crucial factor leading to social conflict and political instability. 
Moreover, it is argued that high inequality levels could influence democratization, instigate rent-
seeking opportunities and lead to higher probability of revolution. However, Thorbecke et. al 
(2002) also note that to test whether income inequality increases the risk of conflict entails 
considering other variables such as education attainment, historical background, ethnicity origins, 
geography amongst others factors to further explain this link. Collier (2000) provides evidence 
of countries characterised by large inequalities, coupled with geographic dispersion and a 
greater dominance of ethnic groups or religious groups, as being more inclined to engage in 
conflict. 
On the contrary, there is evidence which nullifies any direct causal link between standard 
measures of inequality and conflict. For example, Lichbach (1989) argues that there has been 
vast speculation on the actual association between economic inequality and political conflict 
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leading to ambiguous and inconclusive findings. As a result, this provides a good justification to 
investigate differing theoretical and empirical frameworks. Kanbur (2007) postulates that when 
income differences align with structural cleavages, the combination exacerbates tension and 
conflict in society. In his understanding, when society is polarized into a small number of groups 
with distinctive identity this provides a strong stimulus for conflict such that any small adjustments 
in the income distribution between groups results in volatile outcomes. In opposition to this view, 
other theorists such as Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) document no 
causal effect of inequality alone on civil conflict onset. Additionally, Nagel (1974) explains that 
when inequality is high and income differences are considerable, the poor begin to lose a 
framework for social comparisons and the probability of conflict declines at high inequality 
levels. 
Overall, the literature mainly holds that poverty and inequality breed conflict. Although, we are 
strictly interested in looking at inequality in this study, it is worth noting that there is evidence that 
those who direct extreme forms of violence are not themselves impoverished. In most instances, it 
has been found in the literature that violent conflict is a feature of poorer than richer societies. 
However, theory also postulates that elites can mobilize groups towards conflict and further 
provide the means to do so. Collier (2000) argues that the economic theory of conflict postulates 
that the determining factor of whether a country experiences civil war is the extent to which 
rebel organizations are financially viable. In other words, the extent to which such organizations 
can sustain themselves financially is a valid indicator of the likelihood of conflict and is of 
paramount importance relative to the motivation of conflict. 
Esteban and Ray (2008) review the salience of ethnic conflict and explore a wealth of literature 
that reveals the extent to which class divisions are the main cause of social conflict relative to 
ethnic divisions. The authors hypothesise that the salient of ethnic conflict is heightened when 
accompanied by sharp economic inequalities and further postulate that such salience stems from 
two key factors. The first factor points to a hypothesis that ethnic groups experience marked 
within-group income differences. These income differences "weaken within-group coordination" 
and reduce the deprived group members propensity to mobilize collective action (Esteban and 
Ray, 2008: 2186). As a result, the elite within the group are better able to mobilize the 
deprived majority by contributing financial resources for conflict and in return, acquiring cheap 
'conflict labour'. This channel contributes to a bias towards ethnic conflict. The second factor is 
emphasised by Kapferer (1998) where a conflict study in Sri Lanka is undertaken and reveals 
that the conflict protagonists comprised gangs of impoverished and unemployed youth who 
attended protest demonstrations and took part in destructive violence. These factors are 
, L 
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validated by Zhang and Kanbur (1999) who add that polarization is linked to inequality in a 
complex manner. In other words, the patterns of conflict and inequalities are related in a 
nonlinear way such that there is a positive association between conflict and the level of 
between-group inequalities. On the other hand, the authors argue that there is a negative 
relationship between conflict and the level of inequalities within groups. 0stby (2005) concludes 
that inequalities that are characterized by structural attributes (such as ethnicity, religion or 
region) may further increase group grievances and facilitate mobilisation for conflict. 
On a national level, it is hypothesised that wealthier areas are not any less likely to experience 
levels of communal violence. However, as explained by Esteban and Ray (2008), the association 
between inequality and conflict stems from the means by which the rich can coordinate dissent 
by financing the poor who contribute labour and controlling the groups efforts to narrow income 
gaps and strengthening ethnic alliances. Thus, to avoid class unrest the rich effectively provide a 
driving force for strong ethnic coalitions. It must be noted that the nature of the conflict is viewed 
along ethnic lines or based on class divisions. In characterizing conflict forms, Fedderke and 
Kularatne (2008: 12) define the conditions under which the rich will redistribute to the point of 
equality with the poor and provide a detailed extract on how two groups in society are 
engaged in strategic interaction in the process of redistribution. It is found that privileged 
members of society can either allocate resources towards their own well being or enhance the 
productive capacity of deprived groups. The rationale involved in this decision-making involves 
assessing the trade-off between the benefit of redistributing human capital to the 
underprivileged and increasing their productive capacity relative to the cost of greater political 
aspirations of the underprivileged which diminishes the influence of the rich on output extracted 
produced by the economy while still increasing consumption opportunities for the rich. 
This rationale is further corroborated by Acemoglu et. al (2001) who provide examples of 
educational reforms that increase the productive and hence, earnings capacity of the poor and 
deliver greater economic equality which tend to consolidate democracy. A shift towards greater 
democracy or redistributive reforms provides considerable benefits at the expense of an 
increased likelihood of conflict. As pointed out by Lichbach (1989), the study of conflict analysis 
entails normative trade-offs which are also captured in the literature by Fedderke and 
Kularatne (2008). The theory of political transitions postulated by Acemoglu et. al (2001) 
articulates that regime types play an important role in shaping the incentives of rich and poor 
towards their propensity for conflict. Unequal wealth decreases the likelihood of consolidating a 
democracy owing to the redistributive nature of this regime type which promotes economic 
equality to achieve a more egalitarian distribution of assets. Furthermore, the authors investigate 
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how the elite use their power to threaten revolution depending on the opportunity costs involved 
in mobilizing protest. It is hypothesised that the rich elite prefer nondemocratic regimes which 
limit redistributive reforms, as such inequality emerges as a fundamental determinant of political 
instability as it encourages the elite to challenge efforts to consolidate democracy. 
2.3 Empirical Evidence from Developing Countries 
There is strong evidence across countries which shed light on the significant relationship between 
horizontal inequalities and the likelihood of violent conflict. Economic inequality has been the 
main focus of studies undertaken on the revolutions that occurred in Iran, Rhodesia and in 
Columbia as investigated by Midlarsky (1988). There have also been a number of studies 
carried out that indicate that the location of conflict within a country is related to the extent of 
group inequality in that location such as in Indonesia and Nepal. In an Indonesian case study 
undertaken by Mancini (2005), he explains that while the ethnic diversities that exist in Indonesia 
are greatly influenced by its colonial history, a greater source of conflict has been sharp 
economic inequalities. The author explains that Indonesia's economy expanded rapidly at an 
average rate of 4.5% in 2002 and this expansion was simultaneously accompanied by 
increasing inequality. Furthermore, these inequalities were felt within-region as opposed to 
between regions. Booth (2000) adds on that the prevailing inequalities were fuelled by the 
1970s oil boom and Cameron (2001) notes that about two thirds of total inequality in Indonesia 
occurred in the most industrial and oil rich districts. 
Fedderke and Kularatne (2008) outline models of conflict and redistribution for South Africa 
and Sri Lanka. Empirical findings for South Africa and Sri Lanka reveal that political aspirations 
are related to human capital transfers which are measured by enrolment rates at the secondary 
education level are further associated with the proportions of the have's relative to the have-
not's. Economic theory postulates that education plays a vital role in the processes of economic 
growth. There is supplementary empirical evidence which suggest that such growth processes 
create greater divisions in society which leave identified groups behind (say the less-educated) 
relative to the advance of other groups, provoking the likelihood of conflict as a final outcome. 
The emergence of conflict may reverse the initial intended growth process, rendering the entire 
process redundant. 
Empirical evidence from other developing countries such as India identifies that the probability 
of conflict stems from economic development which has left behind tribal populations of poor 
states. In Mexico, growth that was biased to the Southern region resulted in a threat of 
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revolution by the Chiapas. A similar pattern prevailed in China where the rate of attendance of 
the masses in protests and demonstrations has been on the rise, in line with economic booms in 
the economy. It has also been found that group identification played a significant role in the 
initial stages of the civil war in Sri Lanka whereby the economic grievances of the minority Tamil 
community were overshadowed by the majority Sinhala community in suppressing efforts to 
reverse the unfair treatment of the Tamils during the colonial period. The literature holds that 
there are numerous theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that group identification is 
strongly linked to identification of the mean income of that group providing a basis for 
between-group conflict. Further examples of this link are evidenced by riots in Malaysia in the 
late 1960's, the enduring Hindu-Muslim religious divide, revolutions in Latin America, the 
Nigerian civil war amongst others are examples of conflicts that arose due to group economic 
discrimination (Ballentine and Sherman, 2003). Brubaker and Laitin (1998:424) lend support to 
conflict that emerged in the Soviet and Yugoslav post Cold-War cases, as a result of what is 
referred to as the 'ethnicization of political violence' evidenced by an increase in the incidence 
of nationalist violence. 
On the other hand, a number of qualitative case studies have shown that societies that are 
considered highly unequal in terms of income distribution such as Thailand, Pakistan and Brazil 
are not regularly marred by major political conflict. Mancini (2005) provides the example of 
Brazil which has remained relatively peaceful and stable despite its stark income differences. 
However, Stewart (2002) documents examples of high crime rates in Brazil in explaining how 
certain elements of horizontal inequality incite some kind of conflict. Yet, Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994), in addition to Persson and Tabellini (1992) constrast further the positive association 
between conflict (measured by political stability) and income inequality. The authors oppose this 
conventional association in observing a negative link between income and political stability, and 
argue that these results coincide with experiences of East Asian miracle countries. Incidentally, 
these East Asian countries experienced more political stability and less income inequality in 
comparison to Latin American countries at similar income levels. 
2.4 Shifting influences on group identification that aggravate conflict 
There are a number of sources of influence that shape group identification which can trigger 
mobilization for violent conflict. Stewart (2007) highlights that ideology has become a less 
important source of identity and political mobilization, such that the increased probability of 
violent conflicts is derived from causes linked to ethnicity. In her view, ethnic distinctions have 
been strongly attributed as influences of conflict. On the contrary, Rubin (1 994) asserts that the 
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primary influence originates from family as children tend to adopt and inherit their parents' 
ideological values. Some theorists have argued that family tends to be the strongest, most 
influential force which exists over the lifetime. Furthermore, it is alleged that peers have a 
significant impact on group identification. Dey (1997) explains that friends often, but not 
necessarily, have the advantage of being part of the same generation, which collectively 
develops a unique set of societal issues. Dey (1997) argues further that socialization is the 
process through which individuals acquire knowledge, habits, and value orientations that will be 
useful in the future. The ability to relate on this common level points towards the means to shape 
ideological growth. 
Brubaker and Laitin (1998:425) maintain that the motivation behind conflicts has somewhat 
shifted from ideological reasons to "a marked ethnicization of violent challenger-incumbent 
contests". This corroborates Lichbach (1989) view who asserts that the American, French, Russian 
and Chinese Revolution which revolved around nationalism, liberalism and socialism were 
actually based on differing ideas of equality. On the extreme end of the spectrum, one of the 
adverse consequences of sharp group inequalities is mobilizing of groups towards violent conflict 
and we briefly consider the channels by which conflict transforms to violence. Stewart (2007) 
maintains that sharp group inequalities fuel violent group mobilization and ethnic conflicts are 
more likely by providing powerful grievances for leaders to use to mobilize people. This takes 
place when group leaders mobilize groups using cultural markers which point towards exploiting 
the group to reverse its inferior position. According to Kriesberg (1998), as conflict emerges, 
enemy images materialize and stereotypes damage the relationship between adversaries. 
Important lines of communication and interaction that are normal to peaceful relationships are 
cut off, and trust diminishes. As parties begin to attribute their grievances to the other side, they 
often reduce the number of non-conflictual relations and interactions that they have with that 
party. Adversaries tend to become increasingly isolated from each other, and any inter-group 
communication is channelled through more antagonistic lenses. 
Furthermore, as parties belonging to deprived groups have fewer ties to individuals from the 
other group, they may feel freer to employ more severe actions against that group. Dougherty 
and Phaltzgraff (2001) elaborate that radical positions are further reinforced by group 
homogeneity and cohesiveness. Kriesberg (1998) notes that adversaries with little internal 
diversity are more prone to an escalation of conflict which deepens polarization. This is because 
homogeneity makes it less likely that a group will consider alternatives to the severe tactics 
being advocated or employed by extremists. On a macroeconomic level, Alesina et. al (1 991 ) 
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document evidence that heterogeneity in any population is a significant factor in explaining 
delays in the adoption of fiscal adjustment programs. While some scholars of intergroup conflict 
regard polarization and stratification as inevitable in interethnic relationships, others see it as 
the result of social mobilization or manipulation by political elites. Rothchild et. al (2003) 
postulate that leaders can use identity as a 'rallying cry' by calling for mobilization and 
collective action along nationalistic or ethnic lines. Kriesberg (1998) agrees with this by stating 
that in order to foster homogeneity and build support for their cause, such leaders may portray 
the adversary as a grave threat to the vital interests and identity of individuals belonging to 
their group. Thus, political leaders can perpetuate conflict by mobilizing individuals belonging to 
their own ethnic or caste identities and incite violence towards meeting political ends. Against the 
backdrop of increasing inequality in society, this breeds a fertile ground for conflict. 
2.5 Standard measures of conflict and economic inequality 
The economic literature provides a series of measures used to quantify economic inequalities and 
conflict. Hagmeyer-Gaverus (2003) explains that there are potential early warning indicators 
for conflict which include nine main indicator categories namely: justice and human rights, socio-
cultural, internal security setting, geopolitical, socioeconomic, military and security, environment 
and resource management, governance and political stability, regional and country specific 
variables. These broad categories are intended to measure changes in economic and political 
performance while highlighting ethnic issues. Most studies have drawn on these broad categories 
in formulating indexing models which encapsulate structural conditions, further decomposed into 
general and specific indicators of conflict. According to Ebata (2001), structural conditions are 
"deep-rooted and systemic features that structure the relations between people and thus are not 
fluid and amenable to quick or easy change". General indicators have a general applicability 
in all regions in a cross national sample such as major income disparities or ethnic oppression 
whereas specific indicators carry a greater weight in explaining specific regional setting 
differences based on colonial or customary heritage. 
As societies become increasingly heterogeneous, the significance of inequalities between groups 
rises. In light of the distinct ethnic and class groups evident in Kenya (these group identifications 
will be elaborated on further in chapter 3), it is important to understand how to measure these 
horizontal inequalities. It is equally important to understand the standard measures of 
inequalities between individuals as these reflect the impact on the well being of members in a 
society. An important contribution by Horowitz (1985) concludes that divided societies are more 
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likely "horizontally differentiated by ethnic or religious markers" as opposed to the vertical 
wealth or income markers which prevail in caste divisions. The literature articulates that if a 
sample survey from which the national distributions are calculated allows for group identification 
by any of these groups, this allows for cross national analysis which necessarily allows for robust 
findings. Therefore, looking at sub-group distributions or other lower levels of aggregation than 
national level statistics is of paramount importance in explaining the incidence of conflict. 
Empirically speaking, much of the literature defines the concepts of conflict and inequality using 
nationally representative sample surveys of household income or expenditure, whereby 
information can be collected on household income level as well as including a range of socio-
demographic information such as age, gender, ethnicity, occupation status amongst other useful 
information. Using household level surveys, Kanbur (2007) explains that the national distribution 
of income can be inferred by allocating each individual in a household a monetary value from 
the dataset as a measure of the well being and thereafter construct the income distribution for 
the entire sample thereafter. This method depicts the spread of distribution which is relevant in 
providing an indication of inequality. Consider a society distinguished into mutually exclusive 
groups as defined by ethnicity, region, caste or religion, and then each distinct group is 
allocated its income distribution or similar inequality measure such as Gini coefficient. 
One important caveat to consider in using inequality measures such as Gini coefficients based on 
individual income is that this measure fails to capture other important elements of inequality such 
as access to political power, education, housing, land and employment (Mancini, 2005). Sen 
(1980) explains that inequality on other levels such as access to education, land and housing 
may be at least as important as inequality of outcomes like income, consumption or wealth. 
Furthermore, this approach is challenged on the account that it fails to capture group identity 
which is a necessary concomitant of social stability. However, Reynal-Querol (2002), Esteban 
and Ray (1999) and Mancini (2005) provide appropriate inequality measures which depend on 
a number of factors such as group population share amongst other factors and this is explained 
further in defining our variables for this study in chapter 4. With this in mind, it is argued that the 
chosen horizontal inequality measures such as a group-based coefficient of variation by Mancini 
(2005) and polarization measure by Reynal-Querol (2002) capture differences between 
culturally defined groups in economic, social and political spheres and play a crucial role in 
determining the location and timing of violent conflict on the basis of prior qualitative research. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE CASE OF KENYA 
3.1 Historical Overview 
The founding 'father' and first president of Kenya, the late Jomo Kenyatta led Kenya from 
independence in 1963 until his death in 1978, when President Daniel Toroitich arap Moi 
assumed the presidency in a constitutional succession governed under the KANU ruling party. 
Upon Kenyatta's death, a legacy of economic stability and regional leadership had been 
inherited in Kenya. After independence, Kenya promoted rapid economic growth through public 
investment, encouragement of smallholder agricultural production, and incentives for private 
(often foreign) industrial investment. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita grew at an 
annual average of 6.6% from 1963 to 1973 which was stimulated primarily by the agricultural 
sector. Agricultural production grew by 4.7% annually during the same period, stimulated by 
redistributing estates, diffusing new crop strains, and opening new areas to cultivation (World 
Bank, 2008). Between 1974 and 1990, however, Kenya's economic performance declined. This 
was primarily due to a decline in agriculture which was linked to inappropriate agricultural 
policies, insufficient credit, and poor international terms of trade. Kenya's booming economy 
weakened in the 1 980s as a consequence of a rising trade deficit, among other factors. Kenya's 
slowing economic growth rate and expanding budget deficits caused the government to turn to 
structural adjustment policies advocated by the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as part of their economic 
assistance to Kenya. 
Moi consented to internal and external pressure for economic and political liberalization in late 
1991. Despite experiencing a marked political transition in the introduction of multi-party 
politics in 1992, Kenya had its worst economic performance between 1991 and 1993. Growth 
in GDP stagnated, and agricultural production shrank at an annual rate of 3.9% in comparison 
to the upsurge witnessed in the prior decade. Inflation reached a record 100% in August 1993, 
and the government's budget deficit was over 10% of GDP (KNBS, 2009). As a result of these 
combined problems, bilateral and multilateral donors suspended programme aid to Kenya in 
1991. In 1993, the Kenyan government began a major programme of economic reform and 
liberalization. A new Minister of Finance and a new Governor of the Central Bank of Kenya 
undertook a series of economic measures with the assistance of the World Bank and the IMF. As 
part of this programme, the government eliminated price controls and import licensing, removed 
foreign exchange controls, privatised a range of publicly owned companies, reduced the 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
number of civil servants, and introduced conservative fiscal and monetary policies. From 1994 to 
1996, Kenya's real GDP growth rate averaged just over 4% a year (East Africa, 2002). In 
1997, however, the economy entered a period of slowing or stagnant growth, due in part to 
adverse weather conditions and reduced economic activity prior to general elections in 
December 1997. The ethnically fractured opposition failed to dislodge KANU from power in 
elections in 1 992 and 1 997, which were marred by violence and fraud, but were viewed as 
having generally reflected the will of the Kenyan people. 
In 2000, GDP growth was negative, but improved slightly in 2001 as weather conditions 
became favourable for increased agricultural production. Economic growth continued to improve 
slightly in 2002 and reached 1.8% in 2003 (Odundo, 2008). Yet another significant political 
transition in Kenyan history was marked in 2003 when President Moi stepped down in 
December 2002 following fair and peaceful elections and handed over his succession to Mwai 
Kibaki, running as the candidate of the multiethnic, united opposition group, the National 
Rainbow Coalition (NARC) following a campaign centered on an anticorruption platform. This 
transition was followed by an upshot in economic growth which increased at an accelerating rate 
to 4.3% in 2004 and thereafter, 5.8% in 2005 (Campbell, 2006). Incidentally, Kibaki's NARC 
coalition splintered in 2005 over a constitutional review process and government defectors 
joined with KANU (previous ruling party) to form a new opposition coalition, the Orange 
Democratic Movement (ODM), which defeated the government's draft constitution in a popular 
referendum in November 2005 (Freeman, 2009: 1 9). Kibaki's re-election in December 2007 
brought charges of vote rigging and serious irregularities against his Party of National Unity 
(PNU) from opposition chief candidate Raila Odinga and independent observers. The results 
sparked two months of political and ethnic violence in which as many as one thousand five 
hundred people died and countless others were displaced. Peace talks sponsored by the United 
Nations in late February produced a power sharing accord bringing Odinga into the 
government in the restored position of Prime Minister. 
The magnitude of Kenya's post-electoral violence suggests the elections merely triggered a 
situation that was already volatile. The 2007 election fiasco has exposed the deliberate 
encouragement of ethnic tension by power-hungry elites, feeble democratic traditions and 
institutions in Kenya, one that threatens to consume it if not adequately addressed. Furthermore, 
it can be noted that persistent government underperformance, widespread corruption, high 
unemployment and decades of deep ethno-political division led to the resentment that found its 
target in a disputed election result. 
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In spite of the unprecedented turn of events, it is evident that the economic outlook in Kenya has 
been positive during the past decade. The change in political regime in 2003 which transpired 
when incumbent President Mwai Kibaki took office was aimed towards consolidating democracy 
in Kenya and implementing appropriate redistributive reforms and policies. The macroeconomic 
policies implemented were strongly pro-economic growth and geared towards boosting 
economic development, yet implemented with normative trade-offs such as greater inequality 
that is currently prevalent in Kenya. To elaborate, economic development itself generates a 
number of strains on societies that lie at the very roots of conflict. At least initially, economic 
growth tends to increase inequalities within a country, as some communities or individuals benefit 
from rising income and are left behind. This economic theory is evidenced in the Kenyan context 
where growth increased by over 6% since 2000 and yet this was accompanied by ever-
widening gaps in income distribution. This corroborates Kuznets (1955) view who maintains while 
economic growth raises the incomes of the skilled individuals relative to the unskilled; it provides 
an impetus for greater income disparities. As individuals feel marginalized and less privileged, 
polarization between the haves and the haves-not persists which inevitably breeds conflict. 
The Kenyan government has set the ambitious target of achieving the status of industrialized 
economy by 2030. The Kenyan government and policy makers have a tremendous task of 
implementing appropriate reforms and policies to correct its historical setbacks. The main 
challenges include taking candid action on corruption, enacting anti-terrorism and money 
laundering laws, bridging budget deficits, rehabilitating and building infrastructure. It is hoped 
that by addressing these challenges, this will help maintain sound macroeconomic policies, and 
speed up the rapidly accelerating economic growth, which had been projected to grow to 7.2% 
in 2007 compared well to an actual economic growth rate of 7.1 % 
(Ondari, 2009). In 2007, the Kenyan government unveiled Vision 2030, which is a very 
ambitious economic blueprint and which, if implemented in its entirety, has the potential of 
putting the country in the same league as the Asian economic giants. However, in order to attain 
this 'industrialized nation' status by 2030, it is important to trace the impediments to economic 
development which act as limiting factors for enhanced economic activity and future 
development. Ultimately, conflict retards economic development which would suppress the 
efforts of policymakers in Kenya in achieving Vision 2030. 
The argument presented by this study is that conflict in Kenya is fuelled by grievances related to 
economic inequality. This inequality is revealed on a regional level which sheds light on the 
contribution of regional attributes to the probability of conflict. Although the patterns of conflict 
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are complex and difficult to measure, it has been documented that both public and private 
investment of national resources have benefited the Kikuyu and Central region at the expense of 
other deprived groups. Furthermore, economic inequalities in Kenya have continually been 
politically exploited where it is believed that the government posts are viewed as avenues for 
private economic gain and political participation at the expense of maximizing the social 
welfare of Kenyans. As a result, the 2007 election was viewed as an opportunity to garner a 
new era of political leadership that would implement robust economic reforms and correct past 
imbalances. Seemingly, the disturbance in the democratic process observed by vote-rigging and 
irregularities frustrated the efforts of marginalised groups resulting in a violent polarised 
response. 
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3.2 Tribalism and Ethnic Divides 
K ~nya i, a highly h ~terogeneou, co ,", !ry wiTh we ll O" ",r 40 ,ub tribe, which originate from the 
eight main pro.inc." of Kenya nomely, Centro I, COO", E,"'ern, Na irobi, North Ea,t .. m, Nyomo. 
~ift Vall e y and W e . te rn provincg , (figure 1 di,play. the geographic location of all e ight 
province, wh ere th e major ethnic gro"P' liv,,:, The re are eight main tribe, thaT mainly re.ide and 
th ", culturally belong to these region' w ith the ex<.,ption of Noirobi wh ich o<;cotrMl1odote, " 
bl e nd of varying and mix e d e lhnia!;" " Tho, Kikuy u tribe mainly , ,,,.id e in th e lertile high land , 0/ 
the Centro l provin<" and are th e 10rge'T eTmic group. Hi'Tar;coll)" Ihe Kikuyu tribu hove 
domil1oted the co,",!r), both e<onomko liy and pol itically. The ,.,<onci lorge't of th ~ tribe, 
r~,iding in th~ ,am~ proviro:;~ ar~ the M~ ru, Embu and Kamba. Col l~ctiv~l y. th~,~ thr~~ trib~, 
li" ~ In the Emtern provlnc~ 01 Ke nya , um,...,ding Mount Ke nya. Th ~ th ird large" 01 the tribe , 
jOintly living in the m me province are the Luo and Ki,ii who culturoliy belong to on~ 01 the 
,moil er province, - Nyonzo provinc~. I""oted along the W.,,, 01 Kgnyo. Intere,til1gly. the 
Kal ~ njin maiority who o r., only about lo u rte~n p ~ rc~nt 01 the e ntire population r~' ide in th ~ 
larg ~'t provinc~ in K~nya (the Gre at Rift Valle y provinc~ ). The Milikenda and Taita·Tave ta 
~t hnic group Ii" e in the Camtal re gion and ar e known lor th eir trading praCTice, with Arob and 
Pe"ion trade" , ince the 19" ce ntury. The Somo ' tribe con,i" 01 ,gmi-nomodk comel herders 
who mainly inhabit the d ry re gio<l , 01 t"" North Ea,tern provinc~ . Figur~ 2 provide, an 
iliu,tration 0/ the pop ulation ,hare 01 ~ ach ethnic group in Ke nya ba,e d on the 1999 Cgn,u, 
Stoti , ti", . 
fj.gyrw 2, DiIPll,UQI1 QI.mojQr llthnic Q' ouP' in Kwya as a proportion 0/ total pop ulation 
P",portion of ",ajar ~th.i~ Bra"p' i" K~nyc ..... Iativ. to 
loIal pDpulution 
-~-
Sourc~ , Author 2009, u,ing Population and Hou, in g Cen,u, Doto 1999 
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In this study, special attention has been drawn to three ethnic groups namely the Kikuyu, Kalenjin 
and Luo. This is because any ethnic and political conflict that has emerged in Kenya over the 
past few decades has predominantly affected or concerned these three groups. To elaborate 
further, the wave of post-election violence that broke out in 2008 was demonstrated starkly by 
ethnic killings targeted at supporters in PNU and ODM strongholds. These supporters were 
mainly the local Kikuyu, Kalenjin as well as Luo ethnic groups respectively. It has been reported 
that organised attacks in the Rift Valley region belonging to the Kalenjin majority erupted 
against the Kikuyus amongst other PNU supporters. There is evidence that attacks were 
orchestrated by local leaders who exploited deep-seated ethnic resentment over Kikuyu 
settlement since independence. Other retaliatory attacks by gangs of Kikuyu youth were aimed 
at Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin and other groups perceived to be associated with ODM, allegedly these 
youth received payment to perform these attacks (IRIN, 2009). While national level political 
competition in Kenya is often misunderstood and shallowly interpreted in terms of a competition 
between the Kikuyu and the Luo, most commentators on Kenya's politics do ignore the position 
and role of the Kalenjin, Luhya, Kamba, Kisii, Coastal peoples (Mijikenda), Swahili, Arabs, 
Indians and Europeans who live in large farms/ranches and important urban areas in Kenya. 
Each of these groups subsumes a number of smaller ethnic units that become relevant bases of 
social identity in more localized settings. What is however neglected in the debate about 
Kenyan stability is the reality that all ethnic groups have a stake in the running of the Kenyan 
government, but due to systematic exclusion of some groups from the national leadership, 
competitive politics in Kenya is bound to have an ethnic dimension. 
Nepotism along ethnic lines has been viewed as one of the greatest obstacles to Kenyan 
development. It is widely believed that the presidency and other government posts are avenues 
to enhancing economic gain for an individual and that individual's tribe. During Kenyatta's 
presidency, there existed a great sense of alienation of other groups in Kenya from the political 
and economic order for his entire reign which ran from 1963 to 1978. Although Kenyatta (who 
belonged to the Kikuyu tribe) did not instigate ethnic clashes, he targeted eminent persons from 
ethnic groups that he felt were a threat to his leadership. While the first cabinet was quite 
representative of the face of Kenya, soon ideological and socio-economic differences cropped 
in, thus dividing the original personalities in the independence struggle. Further, the Mau Mau 
veterans of the Central region were sidelined and politics of exclusion and elimination begun 
with intensity, sometimes combined with assassinations. Electoral politics never took shape in a 
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democratic sense since Kenyatta who ruled mainly through the provincial administration, outside 
the KANU framework, rendered the party system that could have rallied the people around 
issues and programmes meaningless. 
When incumbent President Kibaki took office in 2002, many Kenyans were optimistic about 
change in casting aside tribalism and building the nation towards higher levels of development 
and better redistribution of national resources. However, it has been alleged that Kibaki's 
coming to power became an opportunity for his closest allies and supporters to regain what they 
had lost under the authoritarian regime of Moi, belonging to the Kalenjin tribe. As a result, civil 
servants from strongholds of the Orange Democratic Movement were retrenched to create 
vacancies for Kibaki's closest allies and supporters mainly derived from the same ethnic group. 
The struggles to consolidate democracy and 'build a democratic African socialist state' as 
pledged by Kenyatta, begun immediately after the postcolonial government were formed. 
However, fears of ethnic ascendancies coupled with power-hungry ethnic political elites and 
undemocratic transitions are all hallmarks of today's Kenya and highlight the undemocratic 
historical trajectory that Kenya has been moving along. Thus, cohesion in Kenya rests on the 
existing coalition government's ability to deal with all economic grievances and hinges on its 
willingness to work as a single unit, the willingness of ruling and opposition party to promote 
reconciliation between tribes, coupled with addressing the distributive balance of Kenya's 
national resources. 
It was in recognition of ethnic fragmentation that the Government committed to establishing a 
framework for managing interethnic relations in the country. This brought about the 
establishment of the department of National Cohesion in the Ministry of Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs by the parliament enacting the National Cohesion and Integration Act of 
2008. However, since then the government has done little to avert future occurrence of the 
afore-mentioned owing to divisions characterized by politicians from the ruling party (PNU) and 
opposition party (ODM) taking hard-line position on pecking orders and level importance in the 
government. It is for this reason that it is not clear what concrete steps the Government is taking 
to assist Kenyans towards integration and cohering; and the country is as ethnically polarized as 
it has ever been. Incidentally, ODM had promised a new constitutional order, devolution and an 
equitable distribution of resources to an electorate frustrated by a lack of progress in promised 
reforms under Kibaki which resulted in a highly ethnically polarised election. 
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The Waki commission established to look at the post-election violence traces some of the causes 
of the unprecedented political polarization that resulted in violence to the retired president, Mr 
Daniel Arap Moi's era, stating that his failure to implement findings of the Akiwumi commission 
into ethnic clashes that rocked parts of the country during the 1992 and 1997 elections 
contributed to the latest chaos. Disparity in resource allocation, lack of leadership, poverty and 
abrogation of responsibility by professionals are just some of the reasons for severe 
polarization that the commission highlighted. Other scholars such as Roberts (2008) attribute 
instability developing through colonial spheres of influence and ethnic stratification as resulting 
from political polarization with ethnic overtones and the reality of people being manipulated by 
politicians. One of the Acts formulated by the lOth parliament to litigate political violence 
imminent in the 2007 election was the Political Parties Act of 2007. The aim of the act, 
according to the Waki commission, was to ensure interethnic harmony. However, in the current 
cacophony of coalition politics, that statute has not been implemented as yet. Although the 
country is at present relatively calm, there is still ethnic tension in the form of power struggles 
because of the division in the government. 
3.3 Graphical Analysis 
In this section, we depict a series of graphical illustrations of the socio-economic state of Kenya 
and its eight provinces. In looking at the intricate trends over time for some factors, we are able 
to trace out the patterns of sharp socio-economic inequalities on both a national and regional 
level in explaining the probability of conflict in Kenya. This aims to highlight the urgency for 
reforms to correct historical setbacks towards a more equitable allocation of resources. 
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Figure 3, Inrome d"jlribution bv Ke nyon proyjos;e in 1999 
Income Distribution by Kenyan province, 1999 
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Figur ~ 3 <how< u, the income di'paritie, betwee n the eight diffe re nt r" gion', The top I 0% of 
re,iden" li.ing "' all the region, " am a 'ignificant proportion of total incom" re lati.e to tM 
bottom 10'% 01 income earner., In the literoture, a rel;able measure of economic inequal ity i, tn.. 
rolio 01 th e riche,t 10% rcloti.c to the poore>! 10% (Thorbccke and Charvmulind, 2002, 1479). 
From Figure 3, w" ob,e rYc that Nairobi, Nyan~a, Rift_Vall e y and th e Emt" rn pro.ince, ha. e tM 
large,t income di,paritie, bejween the rich u>! ond p<>Or~ >! 10% of indi.idual, Ii.ing in eoch 
r" ,pecti. e province , In other word" the top 10% of r" ,idMh in Nairobi, NyanzC1, Rift-Valle y 
and the Emtern province ' e arn more than 40% 01 total incmM . On th ~ othe , hand, th" bonom 
10% of re ;idenl! in the;~ lou, ,egi",,; earn I" " than", fifth of tat",1 income. Given thi, ,tork 
income g op between the top 10% and bottom 10%, we ob>c"e thot only 0 ,mall proportion of 
indi.iduol, e orn lor Ie" than 10% 01 the total incom" . Ba'e d on thi' me a<ure, "''' ;ee that tn.. 
rOlio of th" rid1e;t 10% releti.e to the poore,t ICY'!. i, rather jarge. To 0 lorge extent, thi' 
finding iu,jili u, th u con, iderable ecanomic ",equality witn e"ed in the,e porticular rcgio.,;, 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Fiaure 4 ProporTion of Kenyp n! \"-'iThoot pn)' forma l edlKation 
KO"lo,,15 
" 
"" 
'" c 
Kenyans with no Education by Province and Gender. in 2003 
NaorOOi C<nrol Nyor~ . .... ".", [",",,,. RV~~, 
Sou",,, Demographic He alTh Survey (DHS) DaTa, 2003 
Bo.ed on figure 4, we ,e~ thaT a sma l l proporTion of individual, from Noirobi ond CenTral 
provinc ~, have no education rel aTive To Th e other province, which reveol. Th ~ diverQ ~nT 
horizonTel inequalitie< in education on a r"g ional level. IT i. w orth noTing ThoT there i, On 
increminQly "ark differ,,!>:e beh'ieen mol~, ond f~male, in each p rovince m evident in The 
chort, whe re mol~, ere ,TeTi . Tical ly more educaTed thon I"mole •. The NorTh Ea.T~rn province 
di'play, The mo. T astoni,h;ng finding. wh~ re more Thon 60'% of individual " boTh mol~ ond 
I "mole, hov~ not oTToin~d eny formel Type of edlKotion. 
Figur, 5 ; Poverty incidence acrO'5 e ll proviog:;< jn I>, nyo 2004 
Proportion or Residents Living B~low the Poverty Line ($1Iday) 
Nairobi C~.".I Nyanza W .. lern E,.to" R VlIIlel Cwst N Ea" e 'n 
Source, AUThor, 2009 Uling doto from Kenyo HDR 2004 
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According to 0 rep¢rt by t~ Cent,ol Burgau of STati,!ie, (2006) in K" nyo, the ,ieh u!! 
constituencies are in Central provin<:e, while th u poor .. ,! on<!' or .. To ~ fOlllld in Nyanza 
province, which 00' pove rty level, of oppro<imatel1 65 per cenT. This finding i. 01'0 reflected on 
figure 5. NClTionolly, 14.4 million Kenyon, or obout 60 per cent of the populo!i"" live below the 
poverty line_ Tn " ' .. mi-arid and arid North-Eo'!" 'n provine" with pov" rty I" ve l, of 64 pe r cent, 
ho, been ne glecte d by ,,,,,e,,ive government' since the hi,toric Shilt" war of the 1 960., in 
which 0'''''' ,,,,id,,nt' wonted to ". cede to e it" '" be co me on independent ,toTe or ioin Somolio. 
Okw; "T. 01 (200~i highlighT' ThaT The diffe rence , in POVe rTj""vel, are cou,e d by a multiTude of 
loctor< which ronge from climotic condition, (.uch 0' roinfoll or ,oil le rtility) coupl"d with th e 
pre ,en<:e or ob,e n"" 01 nOMoi r",ource , in ,orne rugion, re lative To oTher<, occe" To 
infrmT"'CTI!rU or public good,j,er.icu. os well os politi",1 ond hi,toricol "ttribuT~', All in ell, 
geogrophy ond inlro'tnxture occovnt lor more thon holl 01 the voriobi lity ,een in poverty rote, 
<>crm' province, in Ken ya. 
Figure 6; Graoh il ",troting the re lation:;i1i p between , QciO eCOllOmic cond'tio'" inte rnol conflict & 
eThnic tenji= 
" 
" ; • 
" 
" • 
" 
" •
, 
, 
0 
~ , 
" 
Graph illustrating the relationship between socioeconomic 
conditions, internal conflict and ethnic tensions 
1-, Sacioewnomic cood,""n. 11 
" "t.' .... ' Con"Ci 
" 
~~. 
u 
--~L" Etlltlic Ten. ion. 
"" 
~ ~ ~ , I , ~ ~ , ~ ~ ~ , , , • < < < < < < < < • • • • • • • • • 
" " " " " " " " " " " " 
Period (.nnu. l) 
Figure 6 provide , a vi,,,ol outlook of th e pottern, e vident in the dota throughout a multiTl!de of 
e conomic, .odol and politicol chong~, in Kenyo Irom 1984 to dote. Ove roll, we ob,e rve thot 
internal conllict and e tfo;ic ten,io", move tog e th e r with" fuw ~.~ption,. Thv. generolly, whe n 
ethnic ten,ion, e>ealate, inturnol conllict i, ,een to in<:re"'e ' imultoneou,ly, Th u onoly,i. 01 the 
o,soeiotion between inte rnol conflict ond ,oeioeconomic condition, i, 'lightly Ie" obviou, ond 
tl"'''~ comple<. The definition, of internol conflict, ethnic te n,ion, ond socio-e conomic condition . 
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are applied here as defined by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rating system. The 
ICRG rating system is based on a set of 22 components grouped into three major categories of 
risk: political, financial, and economic as developed by the Political Risk Service (PRS) Group for 
any given risk assessment. The PRS Group rating utilises a scale of 0- 12 for both internal conflict 
and socio-economic conditions. The ethnic conflict component is assessed using a scale of 0-6 (The 
PRS Group, 2009.) 
Given the variability in welfare levels on a provincial level (evidenced by graphical illustrations 
in figure 3, 4 and 5), the national-level statistics alone depict that the socioeconomic conditions 
have been declining rapidly in Kenya over time. Looking at figure 5, we can see that the 
introduction of multi-party elections in 1992 was followed by an increase in the state of socio-
economic conditions. This could be explained by the fact that in an attempt to consolidate 
democracy, improved distributive reforms had been implemented and the outcome of the 
structural adjustment programs from the early 1990s was positively affecting the state of the 
economy. However, the re-election of autocratic Moi led to a gradual decline in 1997 as 
evidenced in the graph. Central to this analysis, a marked transition was the appointment of 
Mwai Kibaki as the third president of Kenya, which saw an increase in the state of socio-
economic conditions which remained consistent until the next presidential elections at the end of 
2007. Invariably, this sharp rise in the country's socio-economic conditions during this political 
transition in 2003 occurred following Kibaki's pro-economic growth policy implementation. 
Figure 6 also shows that since the introduction of multi party politics in December 1992, ethnic 
tensions remained relatively steady at 3 until the first quarter of 1993 then rose till 4 by the 3 rd 
quarter before dropping back to 3 by year end and then sharply increasing to 5 in mid 1994 
followed again by another drop to 4 by the end of 1994 where it remained steady throughout 
the cycle of the 1992 election for three years. Thereafter tension declined gradually to 1 up 
until the change in the political regime type from Moi to Kibaki. We observe a stark burst in 
tension at the onset of Kibaki's term to a level of 2.5 in mid 2003 which continues rising to 3 until 
the end of that election cycle to the most recent elections of 2007. Here we are interested in 
seeing whether this increase in tension at the beginning of 2003 is matched by any changes in 
internal conflict. 
Kimenyi (1997) explains that the introduction of multiparty politics to Kenya in 1992 led ruling 
and opposition parties to quickly splinter according to ethnic groupings. Muigai (1995) agrees 
that, the first multiparty election held in 1992 rotated around ethnic alignments, and resulted in 
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a pattern repeated in the 1997 general elections. The 1992 multiparty elections was greatly 
marred by violence which left two thousand people dead (Moitui and Islam, 2008) and led to a 
systematic bias towards ethnic alliances. Nevertheless, Oyugi (1997) Orvis (2001) and Apollos 
(2001) hold the view that voting in Kenya is simply a cultural phenomenon which was weakened 
in the 2002 general election when a broad coalition of ethnic groups supported Mwai Kibaki. 
The trends in internal conflict have oscillated over time. Looking at figure 6, we can see that the 
introduction of multi-party elections in 1992 was followed by an increase in internal conflict. The 
re-election of autocratic Arap Moi led to a gradual decline in 1997. However, when current 
president Kibaki was elected in 2002, we observe a sharp increase in the internal conflict 
between January 2003 to April 2003 from 7.5 to 9.5 and then a slight decline in July 2003 
where it remained at a steady high until May 2005 where it fell and remained at around 8 until 
2008. Furthermore, the formation of the first coalition government in 2001 led to a resurgence 
in ethnic and political violence which may further explain this graphical outcome in conflict from 
about 2001 to 2003. Intuitively, we are interested in exploring the factors that caused this 
upshot in internal conflict in Kenya and the possible associations to the sharp effect on ethnic 
tensions albeit an increase in socio-economic conditions in Kenya, ceteris paribus. 
Overall, it is evident that conflict has been prevailing over the past decade at different political 
landmarks. The introduction of multi-party politics in 1992 led political parties to splinter along 
ethnic lines and a significant death toll owing to violence. Following the change in regimes from 
authoritarian Moi towards democracy imposed under Kibaki's rule, there was a resurgence in 
ethnic and political violence. Another episode of political change in government in 2007 led to 
instability across political, economic and social spheres, notwithstanding the scale of the most 
recent crisis that involved staging violent protests and further escalating into outright blood-shed. 
In part due to the ethnic and geographic diversity of the opposition parties involved, no one 
narrative can explain the reaction of opposition supporters that causes such violent rampage. 
Nevertheless, this analysis seeks to understand the role played by structural attributes in the 
presence of economic inequalities on the probability of conflict. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
The theoretical literature reviewed the implications of income inequality as a form of economic 
inequality on the probability of conflict. Specifically, the theory highlights the effect of economic 
growth in exacerbating greater inequalities and the resultant propensity towards fragmenting 
into class divisions or dividing along ethnic lines. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization has been a 
historical issue in Kenya whose intensity has persisted over the past decade. Such fragmentation 
in a cross-section sample across regions affects resource distribution, income, growth and 
economic policies. The methodological framework used encompasses a cross-sectional dataset 
which provides these socio-economic factors and applies this dataset to highlight the structural 
conditions that cause conflict in Kenya. In order to give proper scope to the tentative nature of 
conflict and the causal link between violence breaking out and persistence of economic 
inequality, an ordinal index of polarization utilizing key indicators within the data set used is 
developed. We also develop a conflict index using the principal component analysis. Each 
explanatory variable is selected on the basis of its relatedness to conflict or tension in Kenya, 
backed by various sources of literature. 
In view of the stated objectives of this research, this section seeks to provide a methodological 
framework to analyse the association between the probability of conflict and economic 
inequality coupled with ethnic fragmentation, holding other variables constant that may affect 
the association. The dataset utilized was extracted from two existing cross-sectional surveys 
namely the 2003 Afrobarometer survey and the 1999 Kenya Population and Housing census. 
We take a snapshot analysis of 2003 owing to the fact that, the end of 2002 marked a 
significant change in the political regime through Kenya's first electoral transfer of power 
towards the realization of a full democracy. 
4.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
The study draws mainly on secondary sources to derive relevant models used to explain the 
interaction between conflict and economic inequality, in the face of ethnic diversity in Kenya. 
Secondary data was extracted from the Afrobarometer survey which was conducted in 2003 as 
a nationally representative sample survey. A random sample of 2398 individuals of the adult 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Kenyan population was utilized in this 2003 survey. The sampling technique which follows a 
random, stratified, multi-stage area probability method was implemented using a sampling 
frame from the Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 1999 Population and Housing Census. 
Further, enumeration areas (EA's) were stratified according to administrative province and type 
of location (urban versus rural). The Afrobaromoter findings are a valuable tool for assessing the 
social, economic and political atmosphere in Kenya. In creating a dataset for this study all 
respondents that took part in the survey were considered as the population base. Relevant 
variables from the survey questionnaire were selected and others appended into the dataset. 
The methodological framework assumes intra group homogeneity where the unit of analysis is 
regions, specifically eight provinces. These provinces namely are Central, Coast, Eastern, 
Nairobi, Nyanza, North-Eastern, Rift-Valley and Western. The table below illustrates the 
sampling weight adjusted proportions of respondents from each region. 
Table 1: Composition of Representative Sample Used In the Study, By Region. 
---------------- --
Region Proportion of respondents from 
representative sample (approximate %) 
Rift Valley 24.3 
Eastern 16.3 
- ---------
Nyanza 15.4 
---~~-
Central 13.1 
Western 11.9 
"_ .. --~------
Coast 8.7 
----
Nairobi 7.4 
North Eastern 2.9 
Source: Author using Stata, 2009 
The data analysis method will be both descriptive and inferential statistics. On the quantitative 
data extracted, STAT A will be used to analyze the data. Descriptive statistics such as means, 
percentages, standard deviation and frequency distribution will be used to enable the 
researcher to meaningfully describe the distribution of measurements. While on the qualitative 
data obtained from open ended-questions, an in-depth content analysis will be used to analyze 
the data and the result presented in prose form. Further, logistic regression modelling techniques 
will be employed to produce results for interpretation and policy recommendation. The 
dependent variables and explanatory variables used are elaborated upon in section 4.3. 
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4.3 Variable selection and definition 
In this study, the dependent variable is the conflict index while the independent variables are 
the grouped as follows: economic inequalities, socio-demographic factors, social inequalities. 
Thereafter, we will observe the relationship between these explanatory factors and the conflict 
index to determine the probability of conflict occurring on a national level and regional level. 
Figure 7: The conceptual framework 
Economic inequalities: Income 
polarization, variation of regional mean 
income, changes in land inequality 
Social inequalities: Access to basic services 
-
given by educational and employment -
t--
strata 
Socio-demographic differences in: 
gender, ethnicity or region 
Source: Author, 2009 
Conflict Index 
age, 
-
Probability of conflict 
Incidentally, there are conflicts in all societies but the transformation to violent conflict occurs only 
when there are conditions and processes that facilitate it and where no effective action is taken 
to reverse the process. These conditions are mostly structural in nature and the process by which 
they escalate towards violence are variables that can be monitored by appropriate indicators. 
Conflict-specific indicators are based on information and data that are not easily measured and 
are more qualitative than quantitative in nature. Generally, in the process of analysing variables 
of a qualitative nature, it is imperative to account for any interrelated variables which may be 
generated by some unobserved components. To this end, we shall employ the principal 
components analysis (PCA) so as to retain the variation of each variable considered to construct 
the conflict index. Using the PCA method enables us to extract and estimate common factors in 
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the data set pertaining to the probability of conflict, as well as reduce the dimensionality of the 
data set itself. In the data set, we obtain a large number of variables (variables here refer to 
questionnaire items) which may be correlated to each other i.e. measuring the same construct. 
The principal component approach is essentially a variable reduction procedure which allows 
one to reduce a set of observed variables into a smaller set of artificial variables, known as 
principal components which have maximum variance and are uncorrelated. The PCA approach 
will be explained further in the following paragraphs. 
According to Ebata (2001) a conflict indicator should identify patterns of change amongst 
individuals. In other words, a conflict indictor should give an indication of changes in attitudes 
and values towards violence. Thus, in accordance to the criteria explained by Ebata (2001) and 
based on the PCA procedure, we shall derive the respondents answers to these questions as the 
basis for constructing our dependent variable. Moreover, these responses will provide a reliable 
indication of respondents' propensity to transform conflict to violent conflict. Ebata (2001) 
expresses further the conditions for a conflict-indicator and considers "the institutions, 
mechanisms, procedures and values that manage cooperation and accommodation, competition 
and conflict in all societies, which enable the transformation from conflict to violent conflict". In 
other words, the variable also aims to consider the extent to which respondents are likely to use 
violence as a mechanism for cooperation in the event of rising tension and this highlights the 
deficiency of ordered institutions for resolving conflict. Ultimately, such mechanisms widen 
regional cleavages and spiral out of control into an imminent outbreak of violent conflict. 
The Afrobarometer survey utilised pr ovides a reliable source of qualitative data for the 
indicators of the probability of conflict. The dataset provides, among other indicators of conflict, 
the triggering mechanisms of conflict in Kenya. Seven variables 1 linked to the nature and use of 
violence in conflictual situations, are available in the dataset which are of particular importance 
in constructing the conflict index. The 2003 Afrobarometer survey captures a number of 
economic, political and social phenomena in Kenya and also reveals the causes of violence that 
affects its citizens. Specifically, the survey includes a multitude of questions of relative 
importance in understanding the association between conflict, economic inequality and ethnic 
diversity. It encompasses questions to gauge the likelihood of the use of violence or force for a 
political cause, or rather join others to raise an issue. Additionally, the survey also includes 
questions that highlight the respondents' views of the role of the government in resolving conflict 
and the proportion of problems they regard as solvable by such institutions. The data set used 
I These variables are stated in the appendix part (i). 
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highlights an individual's previous involvement in a demonstration or protest march as a solution 
for conflict and the extent to which violent conflict exist between groups in the country. Other 
views such as the influence of multiparty competition on conflict are raised by the questionnaire 
as well as the key causes of conflict in Kenya as observed by the representative sample. 
Notably, the Afrobarometer survey contains a wealth of information that reveals the perceptions 
of Kenyans in view of the odds of conflict occurring, who is responsible and what is causing the 
conflict in Kenya. The PCA approach is extremely functional in this study where we obtain data 
on seven key variables and consider that these variables are actually correlated to each other. 
A quick look at the correlation matrix2 actually indicates that these variables are not completely 
orthogonal (uncorrelated). Therefore, in order to account for most of the expected variance in 
the observed variables and eliminate redundancy in these variables, we reduce the number of 
variables into principal components using the PCA. In other words, out of the seven variables 
considered, we shall only select those that are most relevant to constructing the conflict index 
using the PCA. The determining factor as to which variables will be used to construct the conflict 
index will depend on the weighting attached to each variable and its magnitude of variance. 
By definition, principal component refers to a linear combination of optimally-weighted 
observed variables (Kim, 1978a). By applying the PCA procedure using STATA, we find that 
there are unique factors present in only three key variables out of the seven variables 
considered which we shall use jointly to construct the conflict variable. In principal, these three 
variables (questions) provide a great deal of weight in constructing the 'likelihood of conflict' 
index as these variables have relatively high factor loadings on this component. Factor loadings 
refer to the sizes of coefficients for any given principle component, thus high factor loadings 
means the chosen variables carry the greatest magnitude and also have unique variances. These 
three questions are worded as follows in the questionnaire (Afro barometer 2003 Survey 
Questionnaire) and refer to Q25e, Q25e and Q76 respectively as denoted in the principal 
component analysis tables in the appendix (iii). 
1. Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell 
me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, 
would you do this if you had the chance: Used force or violence for a political cause? 
C See Appendix for correlation matrix of variables utilised to determine the conflict index. 
A 1 
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2. Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell 
me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, 
would you do this if you had the chance: Attended a demonstration or protest march? 
3. Please tell me which of the following statements is closest to your view. Choose Statement A 
or Statement B. 
A: The use of violence is never justified in Kenyan politics. 
B: In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause. 
The conflict index used in this analysis is constructed from the responses to these questions as a 
result of high factor loadings on one component. More specifically, we draw on the responses 
from the questions indicated above using the principal component analysis approach. For 
example, the responses available to the first two questions each have seven separate response 
options are given below: 
i) No, would never do this, 
ii) No, but would do if had the chance 
iii) Yes, once or twice, 
ivy Yes, several time 
v) Yes, often, 
vi) Don't Know 
vii) Refused to Answer. 
The responses for the third question are: 
i) Agree Very Strongly with A, 
ii) Agree with A 
iii) Agree with B, 
ivy Agree Very Strongly with B, 
v) Agree with Neither, 
vi) Don't Know, 
vii) Refused to Answer. 
For the purposes of this study, we are interested in knowing the scale or extent to which 
respondents are likely to engage in the activity or not as our proxy for the conflict variable. In 
other words, in light of these seven separate response options, what is of relative importance to 
the study is the responsiveness of taking part in these activities which takes a binary value 0 for 
'low' and 1 for 'high' irrespective of the number of times an individual will engage in the stated 
activity. A total of 99% answered the questions using responses 1-5 which leaves a relatively 
insignificant margin of error from dropping responses 6 and 7 in using our binary specification. 
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The use of discrete models to represent conflict by a binary variable is hereby functional, and 
once we identify the conflict categories, we can use discrete choice models such as probit or logit 
to estimate the probability of conflict. Therefore, we shall account for the variance in the 
observed variables using responses 1 -5 in forming the dichotomous variable-probability of 
conflict, such that if the response is 1 or 2 it falls under the binary value 0 for 'low conflict' and if 
the response is 3,4 or 5 it falls under the binary value 1 for 'high conflict'. Moreover, a common 
factor in these three questions is that they all highlight to a greater extent whether or not an 
individual will engage in conflict. 
Polarization Index 
Kenya is a highly heterogeneous country with over three dozen ethnic groups distributed across 
its eight provinces. Provincial regions are represented in the sample in proportion to their share 
of the national population. However, a sample weight (adjusted within country weight) is 
included as a variable in the data set to account for any sampling bias, for example by 
oversampling in the North Eastern province to counter the bias. This is evident in table 1 under 
section 3.1. 
Based on a formulation by Esteban and Ray (ER) in 1999, the polarization index is intended to 
'capture the sum of interpersonal antagonisms'. In other words, this index aims to capture the 
interplay between the sense of group identification (group size) and sense of alienation with 
respect to other groups or intergroup distance. It can be noted that although we expect that 
correlations exist between income and varying region, it is not equally clear which levels of 
income distinguish different groups with common identity, that is, which income levels distinguish 
along ethnic lines. According to an extension on the ER formulation by Collier (2001), a cruder 
specification entails looking at group dominance and factoring this into the index where societies 
qualify as dominated if the largest cohort from a specified region contains between 45% and 
90% of the population. However, this extension does not necessarily apply to the representative 
sample as the largest regional sample, Rift Valley contains only 24% of the population (weight-
adjusted). 
Reynal-Querol (RQ) and Montalvo (2002) derive a more robust index than the index of 
fractionalization and the index of income/wealth polarization formulated by Esteban and Ray 
(1994). These authors postulate that although polarization is a concept that is related to 
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inequality it should also provide more explanatory power for the occurrence of conflicts. This 
stems from the fact that there are significant problems concerning tribal/ethnic conflict which 
have more to do with clustering attributes than inequality of distribution. Therefore, we shall 
apply the main assumptions and axioms of the RQ index of polarization which is represented as: 
where, 
• a refers to the degree of polarization sensitivity in each group i 
• k is a constant 
This equation facilitates a dual purpose: It jointly defines: 
• the Gini index where I Yi-Yi I represents the Euclidean income distance between any two 
groups i and i, and Yi ,Yi is the income level of group i and i respectively. 
• IT; is the proportion of income obtained with respect to the total sample population. 
The only exception to the conventional Gini index is the exponential power (1 +a) which makes 
the RQ index more robust and distinguishes it as a polarization index from inequality measures. 
However, if we want to empirically capture the ethnicity distance, this may be extremely difficult 
and Reynal-Querol (2002) postulates that it is less controversial and simplistic to capture identity 
of groups. Following Reynal-Querol (2002), we consider a dichotomous view where an 
individual belongs to a group or does not belong to a group. Thus, according to the RQ 
formulation, the distance between ethnic groups is generated by a discrete metric 0: of which 0 
is either 0 or 1. Based on the literature, we substitute the Euclidean income distance I Yi-Yi I = 0 
if i=j and I Yi-Yi I = 1 if i:;t:j and the original polarization formulation is altered to an index of 
discrete polarization DP which is formulated as: 
,. 
,'. );n '1-" n 
-- ' 
It is evident that embedding this discrete metric disregards the Euclidean income distance that 
captures income inequalities, which is not entirely relevant for this study as we are interested in 
looking at the yawning income gaps across regions as a possible explanation for the probability 
of conflict. Thus if we were interested in looking purely at ethnicity distances and the resultant 
link to conflict, this DP index would be more instrumental. 
For a more relevant formulation, the parameters a and k are embedded into the formulation to 
distinguish between a polarization measure and inequality measures. If a=O and k= 1, we get a 
discrete Gini index which fails to capture ethnic diversity. On the contrary, this can be 
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di,tingui,hed frol~ a g eneral poIorizoti"" me asur e where (1)0 and to ,oti,fy the propertie' 
postulot~ d by ~ ~ ynol-Oueral and MaTlavo (2002i we o"ume ,pecificolly thot (1=1 and k=4. 
Thi , i, be cou,e when CI '" I, the only k that norm"liz~, the DP ;"oox OOTw uen 0 and 1 i, k=4. 
The refore the DP index ' implifie, further to, 
• 
N 
o 
Source , AuThor, 2009 u' ing Stoto 10 
, , 
In COme 
Fig ur e 7 repr~ '~ nt' the incom ~ di , tributiDrl of al l tr., individcol, inte"iew~d who form the 
nOT ionally re p re,entotive ,om pl e . It i, cl e a r that there ore yawning gop, be tween the hov e ', 
and The hav e -nd , 0' illustraTe d by The large voriotioo in diSTribuTioo which i, re laTively ,kewed 
To The left. The,e income diffuret1cus amongST ru'pondenTs "' our repru,",nTaTive ,ample will be 
faotored into the pola riz atioo inde , to ide ntify the ""o:;iotiQ!1 with th ~ probobility of CQ!1 flict in 
011 region, . 
Group-baoe d coeffici e nt of variation of income 
In orde r to perform logi,tic regrc"iQ!1 , thot oocount for" bctwccn-group oomponent of incom ~ 
diffcre ncc" we "pply the group_bo'cd coeffic ient of variation a, 0 me"sure for diffe re nce, in 
mean monThly irKome per region relaTive To th e overall ,ample mean monthly income. Thi, i, 
be cou.e at lowe r le vel. of oggre gotioo, the poloritoti"" voriobl ~ i, o<>lin ~ or with th e regioo 
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va ,iable 10' it i, uwd ill corlSlnKlillg Ihe index) and render> Ihe regre"ion modelling ul1f" mibl~. 
In Ih;, regwd, we present a ' econd model u,ing GCOV 10 caplur" income difference, whic h is 
ju,tif ied by Mancil1i {2005) in Ih" con l"xt of mea"-ning income ine'lualitie, in the IJre,ence of 
rnO,e Ihan Iwo elhnic group, ond 0 t~i rd model u,ing GCOV plu, th" r~gio " du rnrn ie,. STewwl, 
Brown a "d M(~lCjlli {2005) opprove Ihe GCOV m being on ideal meawre m it i, de>criptive, 
,emitive to group size and mea,ure, i""quolity betw"en group '. Th i, i, lurlh" r ,upporTed by 
KOl1bur 12007) who " xplai", thai u,i"g "",""my ,ta ti ,Tics such as the mean i, robu,t in 
idell lifying varying distributions of incon"IC beTween groop'. Thu" to delil1" th " GCOY vor i<1bl" 
for com reg ion, we u,e th " fo llowing fortnlJ l<1tion , 
"1 , \ ,,,, i _. 
~ 
, 
111 Tf>., " qlJ<1tion abov", C i, Th" '<1mp l" rn e<1n ;"come, p, i. Tile group' popul"tioo >hare and ;C, i, 
Ihe group r me,", v"Jue of income; r reler> to reg ion. E"el1tially, T~i, group inequa lity m" a"",, i, 
ti>c varionc" divid~d by th e m" a" <1nd by 'quming the dev;al ioo, lrom th e fl""<1Il, thi' g ive, 
greater .vei~hTing to The extreme, of our de"ript;ve meawre. 
Control variabl", 
a) Education 
Empirica ll y, more etl~,icol ly dive"e counTie, and "ate, in Ih e United State, 'pend Ie" on pubnc 
good, ouch t~at ,tote, with mor" e t~n ic heterogeneity produc" lowe r hig~ >c~ool g ra dua tiol1 
rate ' {lnd Ie" "'pporl for pub lic eduwtion. Emt~rl)"i2001) add , on thm i" Ke nya, th " r~ i, I" " 
fUlld ing for prin1<1ry "hool, in more ethl1icolly dive"e regi on,. 111 view of t~e,e finding" we ']wl l 
include 01' educmion v",;oble ta leST iTS explOl,mary powe, of the like lihood of conflicl whe,e 
educationa l otto illtl...,nt I" ve h are lower. More imporl<1ntly, w" cOI1,ider how a reg1or1 
predominmtly inhabited by " more educated ma jority wi ll "flect the probability 01 conflicl in 
that or" a. Educotiol1 ochie v" me nt wo, categorized accordil1g to t~e ~ i g~e't leve l of ,chool il1g 
completed - no ' chooli"g, primmy, ,ecoodary {llld Tertia ry for eXp10r<110fY <1naly , i,. Ce t" ri, 
poribu" we expect two diflerel1t outcome, in thee regre"ion of the cor,fiict index on eduwtior,. 
Ba,ed or1 ,upportil1g evidellee by Fedderke and Kula",tne j200B), the more educaled on 
individuol, The greater Their po liTicol o'pir<1liom wh ich t"."laTe, 10 a greaTer i"fluence 00 the 
outpUT produced by ony given ecooo rny. In Ihi s way, Ihi , r" ",oo ing validaT" , why on individual 
wi th high e r " ducaTion l ~ v " l , hm rnor" to gai" by " "g{lg ing in conflict to prevent thi, outcome. 
On ti>c other ~and, 011 individual with higher educatior, level, i, likely to ,eap mo,e benefit< f,orn 
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his own productive capacity. As such, the opportunity cost of engaging in conflict may outweigh 
the gains from engaging in conflict. 
b) Employment 
In the wake of globalisation, the crisis of economic regulation in the industrialized world is 
reflected in high structural unemployment. It provides a fertile ground for the dynamic expansion 
of globalisation and proliferates violence and the resultant threat of it as a means to regulate 
economic transactions. In light of this theoretical view, we will test the statistical significance of 
unemployment as an explanation for the probability of conflict occurring in Kenya. Our 
expectations are that unemployment strata brings about fertile ground for conflict as it promotes 
group marginalisation where the benefits of growth are likely to be enjoyed by the privileged 
employed. 
c) Land inequality 
The Kenyan economy relies mainly on its primary sector, specifically the agricultural sector for its 
international trade. As a result, a large proportion of employment derives from farming 
activities or the primary sector as a source of income and gross domestic product, respectively. 
Since independence, there had been a notable change in equal access to land between 
provinces which would indirectly affect the inputs available to farmers altering income stability 
and so forth. Furthermore, an inequitable distribution of land resources distorts regional GDP if 
a region relies mainly on its primary sector as a source of income. As a result, the influence of 
inequality in land holdings is of great significance in Kenya where agriculture (amongst other 
forms of farming activities) accounts for a considerable proportion of economic output and 
employment. Moitui et. al (2008) notes that many Kenyans depend on land for their survival 
particularly those living in rural areas. Land inequality 3 accompanied by poor land tenure 
legislation and poorly-defined property rights raise a multiplicity of socio-economic concerns. 
We therefore expect that increases in land inequality (assuming property rights are not well 
defined) will increase the probability of conflict. 
3 Land inequality is defined as applied in the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (2005/6), developed by 
the Society for International Development and refers to the disproportionate distribution of land based on land 
potential, tenure system, arability and carrying capacity. The appendix part (v) presents a table of changes in land 
inequality derived from the KIHBS survey data. 
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d) Rural/Urban divide 
Although agriculture contributes largely to Kenya's GDP, the economic development over the 
years has shed light on the importance of access to housing in a municipal setting where policies 
are better targeted towards better sanitation and infrastructure, among other forms of regional 
development. Moreover, an urban-rural divide in any society reveals its spatial inequality and 
the literature maintains that such a divide reflects how the benefits of growth are enjoyed by 
elite communities living in urban areas. This would ultimately generate tension between those in 
urbanized settings and those in rural areas, thereby causing a greater propensity to conflict. 
e) Age & Gender 
On a global scale, the job market is an intricate setting to engage in as a new entrant 
especially in the advent of recessionary times. In many parts of the world especially the 
developing world, there are relatively few jobs on offer in the formal economy for the masses 
of young people reaching the age to enter the labour market. According to Peter (2004), 
unemployment rates (in the regular economy) of well above 50 % among young people 
between 15 to 25 years of age are commonplace in many countries. Peter (2004) adds on 
worldwide younger generations are predominantly affected by social exclusion. The age bias 
of this social exclusion may breed violence related to the need for urgent economic regulation to 
accommodate them in the labour market. Furthermore, an added element of violent crime is that 
not only is it characterized by this age bias but it is held that violence is also "statistically the 
preserve of males between 15 and 35 years" (Peter, 2004). As such we will test the 
explanatory power of these variables and observe the causal links if any, between agel 
gender and violence. 
f) Region 
We also factor in the region variable which is a good variable to use in this Kenyan case study 
because it aligns ideally with ethnic divides raising the prospect of group tensions. It is important 
to factor this variable into the overall model as it has been alleged as a source of 
intra provincial tension. We shall test the explanatory power of region on the probability of 
conflict, with the expectation that ethnic alliances are likely to be formed in the resource-rich 
areas. The levels of household welfare vary by regions and hence dummies representing the 
eight Kenyan provinces are used to capture these regional variations. Separate models for each 
of the regions are also estimated. 
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4.4 Bivariate Analysis 
4.4.1 Linking group identification to structural and class differences 
For the purposes of this research, we are interested in looking at the interaction between 
polarization (characterized by income differences and ethnicity) and the probability of conflict 
in Kenya, ceteris paribus. In the preceding paragraphs, DP polarization is defined by an index 
which is a product of income inequality and region. Contrary to widespread belief, Kenyans 
self-defined identities do not derive purely from ethnic association but an interplay of other 
factors such as occupation, religion, class to name a few. Our main focus lies in understanding 
the interplay between ethnicity distances and class divisions. Thus we attempt to capture the 
relationship between economic inequality along ethnic distances and the resultant link to social 
unrest or conflict. In order to shape our understanding of this link, we undertake a bivariate 
analysis of the following variables: 
Region/Identity group 
The results indicate that respondents from the Rift Valley province (largest province in Kenya in 
geographical and population size) identified the most with a language/tribe/ethnic group and 
class, with 27% and 26% respectively. Further, within the region category, 51 % of the 
respondents from Rift Valley identified with belonging to the region itself rather than assuming a 
national identity. Incidentally, taking into account all respondents in the sample, yields low levels 
of ethno-linguistic identification expressed by respondents, who identify most with their 
occupation (39% of the sample). This makes an interesting test of the hypothesis that as ethnicity 
does not predominantly characterize self-identification with a region, ethnicity divisions will not 
playa major role in understanding the probability of conflict. 
Region/Household Income 
On a national level, an analysis of the survey data confirms the massive maldistribution of 
income in Kenya. Generally, about 44% of the respondents earn less than $US20 per month, 
yet 6% of the sample report a monthly income of about $US200 (nearly ten-fold) (IRIN, 2008). 
Evidently, the inequality gaps are quite stark and reinforce findings by UNDP(2003) that while 
the poorest quintile receive 2.5% of total income, the richest quintile earn over 50% of total 
income. In terms of the ethno-linguistic groups, it was noted that about 6% of the respondents 
from the Nairobi region fell into the higher income brackets whereas 4% came from the Central 
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region. On the contrary, 84% of the respondents from the Western region received income less 
than the minimum wage whereas 3% of respondents in the same region received and monthly 
income greater than $US200. 
Identity group/Household Income 
This analysis is particularly meaningful for this study as it highlights the interplay between group 
identification and income differences which addresses one of the key objectives of this research. 
Specifically, by exploring the differences in group identification we make some notable 
observations. Firstly, respondents in the sample who fall under income bracket income_1 i.e less 
than ksh5000 are notably more inclined to identify with an ethnic group than those respondents 
earning a monthly salary of say R25,OOO (income_3 bracket). Further, individuals in the highest 
income bracket are almost five more times inclined to identify with a class group than those with 
no cash income. 
Identity group/Education 
Another interesting observation is that those respondents who have attained a tertiary education 
are more likely to identify themselves according to class (14%) in comparison to those without 
formal education (5%). Moreover, the latter respondents identify more with their ethno-linguistic 
group (19%) as compared to their educated counterparts of whom only 9% identify with an 
ethnic group. 
4.4.2 Regional analysis using explanatory variables. 
The association between region (used as a proxy for ethnicity) and the probability of conflict is 
a good starting point in developing our analysis as it sheds light on the propensity of individuals 
belonging to a certain ethnic group to engage in conflict. From the findings presented in table 2, 
we can form our expectations of the regions that have a greater propensity for conflict and 
further validate these expectations from the regression modelling thereafter. 
Table 2 reflects the income differences in each region in terms of the mean monthly income, 
relative to the average income of all the regions. From this information, we will investigate the 
possible links between income disparities by region and the probability of conflict as 
hypothesized in the literature using logistic regression modelling in section 5.1 . 
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Table 2: Indication of mean monthly income, by region. 
mean 
monthly 
income (in 
Kenyan 
region shillings) 
Central 6644.878 
Coast 4803.381 
Eastern 5549.778 
Nairobi 9897.396 
North Eastern 6892.595 
Nyanza 4042.586 
Rift-Valley 7683.445 
Western 6948.03 
Average 6463.486 
From table 2, we can see that Nairobi and Rift-Valley provinces boast the greatest average 
income, whereas the average income is the lowest in Nyanza province followed by the Coast 
province. A notable observation is that the North Eastern province records one of the higher 
average incomes relative to the other regions, albeit evidence from Kenya's HDI that indicates 
North Eastern has the second highest incidence of poverty i.e. where a vast majority of its 
residents live below the poverty line. Nyanza province records the greatest poverty incidence 
amongst its residents which is accurately reflected in its lowest average income figures. To 
emphasise on the income discrepancies per region, we observe the degree of income 
polarisation in each region using an index generated in the previous chapter. This set of indices 
is indicated on table 3 below. 
Table 3: Indication of income polarization of each region, relative to the average level 
POLARIZA TION INDEX BY 
REGION 
region mean 
Central 0.992643 
Coast 0.994054 
Eastern 0.993429 
Nairobi 0.99115 
North Eastern 0.992486 
Nyanza 0.994769 
Rift-Valley 0.992034 
Western 0.992452 
Average 0.992877 
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Evidently, there is little or no variation in the polarization index within regions. All in all, we 
observe that all the regions are highly polarized which is an intuitive indication of the yawning 
gap between rich and poor irrespective of regional base in Kenya. More specifically, Nyanza, 
Coast and Eastern are the most polarized regions (reporting above average figures) with 
Nairobi being the least polarized region relative to the other regions. 
In further understanding the divergent welfare levels of individuals on a provincial level, we can 
further validate the propensity of conflict explained by horizontal inequality in education. The 
accessibility and attainment level of education contributes largely to the welfare of society 
owing to the marginal economic benefits achieved from being more educated. 
Table 4: Proportion of education level attained, by province 
EDUCATION LEVEL ATTAINED, BY PROVINCE 
province no formal schooling primary secondary tertiary Total 
Central 5.74 31.76 43.58 18.92 100 
Coast 20.29 51.69 21.74 6.28 100 
-~ 
Eastern 14.14 40.87 31.88 13.11 100 
Nairobi 1.7 26.7 46.02 25.57 100 
North Eastern 72.03 11.02 13.56 3.39 100 
Nyanza 7.39 50.85 31.82 9.94 100 
Rift-Valley 12.67 35.96 37.67 13.7 100 
Western 6.62 34.19 47.79 11.4 100 
Total 13.37 37.68 35.8 13.16 100 
----~---
From table 4, we see that of all eight provinces: a greater proportion of respondents from 
Central(44%), Nairobi(46%), Rift-Valley(38%) and Western(48%) provinces have attained 
secondary education whereas majority of respondents from Coast(52%), Eastern(41 %), 
Nyanza(51 %) have only attained primary education. A stark finding is that about 72 (%) of 
respondents from North Eastern had no formal schooling. 
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Table 5: Proportion of respondents who are employed relative to those unemployed, by 
province. 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS, BY PROVINCE 
province employed unemployed Average 
Central 11.95 13.09 12.36 
Coast 7.35 11.12 8.72 
Eastern 17.86 13.44 16.26 
Nairobi 6.5 8.81 7.33 
--
North Eastern 5.91 3.24 4.95 
Nyanza 15.82 12.86 14.75 
Rift-Valley 20.88 30.13 24.22 
Western 13.72 7.3 1 1.4 
Total 100 100 100 
Looking at the employment status of respondents from the different regions is functional in 
showing the socio-economic inequalities prevalent in each region. From table 5, it is clear that a 
greater proportion of individuals from Eastern, North Eastern, Nyanza and Western provinces 
are unemployed relative to the average proportion of unemployed respondents from the other 
four provinces. 
As described earlier, we expect that individuals who are younger than 35 years of age are 
more likely to engage in conflict than older counterparts above 35. In view of this expectation, 
we expect higher probabilities of conflict in Central, Coast, Nairobi, Nyanza, Rift-Valley and 
Western provinces as these regions report a large number of individuals falling into the conflict 
age-category as tabulated in Table 6. 
Table 6: Age of respondents, by province 
AGE OF RESPONDENTS, BY PROVINCE 
between 
15-35 over 35 
province years years Total 
-----
Central 54.39 45.61 100 
.-
Coast 62.98 37.02 100 
Eastern 47.69 52.31 100 
Nairobi 68.18 31.82 100 
North Eastern 45.83 54.17 100 
-~ 
Nyanza 55.68 44.32 100 
.. _--
Rift-Valley 60.96 39.04 100 
--
Western 59.93 40.07 100 
... .., 
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4.5 Model Specifkotion 
The major gOGI 01 thi, ,ectian i, to d"v~I"P CI 'et allogi,tic e,timation, ta t" ,t th e hypath" 'i' that 
th" prabcd,ility 01 the occurrence 01 conllict i, determined in the pre,ence ot economic and ,ocial 
ineqwalitie, acrm, legiall' ill K" nyci. I" light 01 ~ thnic div" "ity i" K" nya, "I " ob,~r"" th" 
probabi lity ot the occurrence of conflict as a rewlt of difference, ill income, ed<JCatiol1, age, 
gender, land inequality, ,ettlement arecl, reg ion and "mplaym~nt , tatu, on a natiancil and 
r" gianal I" vel. Bmed 011 the polarization index constructed, '-"'e aho as,ess it, rewltant link to 
conflict potential overall. 
Based on the ,tated d~fi"itia", af the d"pend~l1t wrd " Kpl clnatory var;abl~, arrd corr" lat ;on 
w-.aIYle" we formulate four general nlOdcl, as, 
, 
~, c , 
c 
L'I , , 
" 
." ;;F<' ;:' == Po' POL, j!J., EDUC. +!h RURAL, + P. LAND OWN,+ Po AGf.-"P~ UNEMPLOYfD,+ 
fI MALE, 
Therelore Ihe pmoobtlily of Ih e Oc<Urrellce of cooll,d i, delermined by lhe fundioll' 
1 - ~ 
U,mg II", .,Irudure, we ,1",11 ,,1'0 le, 1 II", hypolhe,;, Ihal confiie! o{wr, in Inc pcc'Cn{c 01 .\0(10-
e<ooonlic ir>eql>Olilie, alld regi()()(jl difference, by e,limoling Ihree olher model" 
,-,here Z, = a GCOV, +{3 fDUC.+o IlURAl.+ {3, lAND_OWN, +OAGE,+ OUNfMI'IOYED,-<-
IJMALf,"c, 
where Z, a GCOV, +{3 EDUC,+it RURAl.-<- OAGE,+ OUNfMPlOYED,+ )JMAlf ,-<- {lIe' RfG.'ON, 
.. , 
, 
,", - . 
, 
0 __ ' __ ' __ 
'_.~C':'·: __ 
Where Z, = /3JDUC •. /33IlURA[' + /3, lAND_OWN;-<-/3., AGE, + /30 UNfMP10YfD;+{l1 
MALE, ',/3,0 R[CiON, +e, 
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;::. F ~ .. 
We also specify (J modcithat look, ot the reg ion (" th e unit of onaly,i" 
Wncrc z, ~ (1 INC, +/1 fOlIC, -'-0 RURAl. + rrlAND_OWN,+ OAGE.+ iJtJNEMJ'lOYfD,T 
jJMAlf,+ e, 
:;: = f ?-
4_5.1 hpected signs and correlations 
We briefly highlight the correlation, between tnc dependent ¥ariable-conflict clnd e xplonotory 
vmiab le, i" compmi,O!\ 10 The expected signs, based OIl some of the theoreticol orgument, 
explored in d\CJpter 2. 
Vor;able 
Polori,ation 
GCOV 
educotion 
• Primory 
• Secondary 
• tert iory 
unemp lo yed 
Ll. j" land own 
male 
region d.",--." Y 
-in the presence of 
roc i 0- e C 0" OIll ic 
ine qualiti e , 
rurol 
Actuol sign 
. {+ ) 
i {+] 
[+[ 
H 
[+[ 
(-.-: 
H 
[+, 
[+, 
[+, 
hpected ,;gn 
i (+) 
[+[ 
I {+] 
[+[ , 
[+[ 
(+: 
[+, 
[+[ 
(+) 
[+, 
[+[ 
(- ! 
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Table 7: Code Sheet for the Conflict/Economic Inequality Study 
Variable Description Codes/Values Name 
1 Conflict Index O=low CONFLICT 
I 1 =high 
, 
2 Polarization Index O<pol<l POL 
(Interaction btwn 
monthly average 
proportionate 
income and region) 
--
3 Group-based In brackets GCOV 
variation in income 
--
4 Educational O=no schooling EDUC 
attainment level per 1 =otherwise 
region 
5 Rural/Urban Divide O=urban RURAL 
1 =rural 
-
--
6 Household income In brackets INC 
7 Age 0= age>35 AGE 
1 =age<=35 
8 Gender O=Female MALE 
1 =Male 
9 Change in land (%) LAND OWN 
-
inequality 
.~ 
We also include the region variable denoted by REGIONi, where i= 1,2 .. 8 accounts for all 8 
provinces in Kenya. The region variable is estimated by dummy variables where the Central 
region is the base category. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: ANAL Y515 OF RE5UL T5 
5.1 Empirical Analysis 
This section seeks to present the findings from the logistic regressions of the specified model 
presented in the preceding chapter. The null hypothesis is Ho: socio-economic inequalities do not 
have a significant impact on the probability of the conflict occurring on a national and regional 
level, against the background of our theoretical expectations. Thus controlling for individual and 
household characteristics and a few socio-demographic variables such as region, age, gender, 
we shall test the odds in favour of conflict occurring at the conventional 1 %, 5% and 10% levels 
of significance. 
5.1.1 Individual Significance 
Table 8: Logistic regression results for conflict model estimated on a regional level 
1= h/hold 
-- ---- -- ---
Central Coast Eastern Nairobi North Nyanza Rift Valley Western 
Eastern 
.. -
1.000049 1.000035 1.000048 0.999983 0.999943 0.999981 1.000017 0.999987 
(0.029)** (0.218) (0.039)** (0.356) (0.529) (0.491 ) (0.127) (0.584) Income 
0.805899 0.536340 1.50972 0.73143 0.802789 0.333545 1.573281 1.27449 
-
leduc_1 (0.776) (0.227) (0.618) (0.835) (0.888) (0.128) (0.449) (0.853) 
0.587153 0.692618 3.307482 0.569316 2.486674 0.230666 1.393725 1.423545 
-
leduc_2 (0.486) (0.546) (0.142) (0.708) (0.560) (0.048)** (0.582) (0.788) 
---------
0.365629 0.045933 3.377057 1.530236 8.569921 0.546625 1.873022 0.816652 
-
leduc3 (0.278) (0.011 )*** (0.180) (0.781 ) (0.337) (0.487) (0.343) (0.888) 
~-----
1.874183 2.59432 1.161912 1.738873 9.575093 3.248418 1.55102 2.879353 
male (0.051 )** (0.012)*** (0.672) (0.218) (0.181) (0.000)*** (0.082)* (0.032)** 
0.842326 0.664439 0.744050 1.370408 2.844742 0.282749 0.857952 0.597604 
unemployed (0.590) (0.283) (0.424) (0.499) (0.399) (0.000)*** (0.548) (0.293) 
1.602275 1.946999 1.27849 1.069593 4.322531 0.824477 2.719782 0.642303--
age_35 (0.153) (0.102) (0.497) (0.881) (0.343) (0.550) (0.000)*** (0.390) 
--~---
1.122344 1.813868 0.322177 - 0.145663 1.077779 0.623781 3.823167 
rural (0.807) (0.165) (0.040)*** (0.187) (0.887) (0.142) (0.057)* 
--------
Pseudo R2 .0381 0.1109 0.1145 0.0418 0.3333 0.1357 0.0555 0.0886 
Prob > chi 2 (0.2326) (0.0042)··· (0.0006)··· (0.4806) (0.1222) (0.0000) .. · (0.0021) .. · (0.1822) 
log likelihood -132.341 89.714 -105.944 -74.645 -12.714 131.161 -205.893 -58.424 
------
Note: The p-value of the z-statistic is indicated in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated by *** at 1 %, ** at 
5% and * at 10% conventional levels. 
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The regression results shown in table 8 display individual estimations at the regional level, and 
the overall significance of each model is shown in the last row. The pseudo R2 is not necessarily a 
good indicator of goodness of fit as given by the adjusted R2 in OLS regression. However, the 
psuedo R2 provides a quick way to compare the fit of different models for the same dependent 
variable. Hamilton (2003) explains that the pseudo R2 lacks the straightforward explained-
variance interpretation of true R2 in OLS regression. Although the pseudo R2 in these estimations 
is relatively low, there is a strong statistically significant relationship between the probability of 
conflict and the explanatory variables at the 1 % level of significance, ceteris paribus. 
From the results in table 8, we observe that Central, Nairobi, North Eastern and Western 
provinces are not statistically significant at any conventional level of significance, and we can 
reject the hypothesis that the likelihood of conflict occurring is affected by any of the 
explanatory variables in these individual regions. On the other hand, we conclude that the odds 
in favour of conflict occurring is greater in the Coast, Eastern, Nyanza and Rift-Valley provinces. 
This is explained by the income inequalities prevalent in these regions, attaining higher levels of 
education, being a male, being unemployed and residing in a rural settlement area. These 
findings are corroborated by the results in table 2, 3, 4 and 5 which reveal that respondents 
from the Coast, Nyanza and Eastern provinces have the lowest income earnings and lowest level 
of education relative to the other regions. The fact that the Rift-Valley province is also 
statistically significant is an interesting finding as respondents from this region have attained 
above average income levels and education levels. A possible explanation for this finding could 
be drawn from the fact that there is a relatively significant proportion of unemployed 
respondents from the Rift-Valley province, which could be significantly larger than higher income 
earners or more educated respondents. All in all, the regression models for these regions reveal 
very robust findings and for each of these four regions the conflict models are highly statistically 
significant at the 1 % level. 
For the Central province, the odds in favour of conflict increases if income increases and an 
individual is a male; in this case, the odds in favour of conflict are statistically significant at the 
5% level of significance. However, the likelihood of conflict due to all the other explanatory 
variables is not statistically significant. In the Coast province, the odds in favour of conflict 
occurring is positively associated with attaining a tertiary education and being a male at the 
conventional 5% and 10% levels of significance. For the Eastern region: if an individual is a 
male and the higher the income, the greater the likelihood of conflict at the 1 % and 5% level of 
significance respectively. The propensity to engage in conflict for individuals from Nairobi and 
Un
ive
rsi
ty
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
North Eastern provinces is not related to any of the explanatory variables in question at any 
conventional level of significance. In Nyanza province, the likelihood of conflict is highly related 
to attaining a secondary education relative to no schooling, being a male and being 
unemployed at the 5% and 1 % levels of significance respectively. The Rift-Valley province 
reveals a strong association between being a male under the age of 35 years of age and an 
increased probability of conflict at the 10% and 1 % level of significance, whereas we find that 
no statistical association or significance is found with the other explanatory variables. Similarly, 
in the Western region, the odds in favour of conflict as a result of being a male are statistically 
significant at the 5% and further, the odds of conflict occurring increase if an individual resides 
in a rural settlement area at the 1 % levels of significance. However none of the other 
explanatory variables are statistically significant for the Western province. To a large extent, 
the association between the stated explanatory variables and the odds in favour of conflict is 
insightful for the Coast, Eastern, Nyanza and Rift-Valley regions, and conforms to expectations 
whereby areas that reveal high within-group economic inequality will have a bias towards 
ethnic conflict. This provides a good justification within the sample for the odds in favour of 
conflict occurring in these regions. 
5.1.2 Joint Significance 
Table 9: Logistic regression results for all conflict models estimated on a national level 
I Conflict Model 1 (captures Model 2 (captures Model 3 (GCOV + Model 4 (only I 
within group btwn group region includes region 
income var) income var) differentials) differentials) 
------.-~ 
Polarisation 1.48e-49 
(0.088)* 
---------
GCOV 6.860969 0.0075719 
(0.111) (0.690) 
-----
education: 
• primary 1.377629 1.374791 1.296494 1.308025 
(0.057)* (0.101)* (0.0.219) (0.135) 
• secondary 1.29069 1.285115 1.189785 1.245823 
(0.138) (0.205) (0.428) (0.235) 
• tertiary 1.757406 1.616945 1.507969 1.675035 
(0.004)*** (0.035)** (0.099)* (0.014)* 
unemployed 0.7598826 0.6120543 0.6265245 0.765636 
(0.004)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.006)*** 
--
land_own 9.53717 4.817406 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
--~-----~ 
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age: < 35 yrs 1.492646 1.315889 1.305118 1.492461 
(0.000)*** (0.015)*** (0.02)** (0.000)*** 
---- -
male 1.623024 1.735733 1.770584 1.635718 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Rural area 0.6222344 0.6641088 0.9072673 0.818427 
(0.000)*** (0.004)*** (0.551) (0.143) 
region: 
• Coast 2.295427 1.699507 
(0.234) (0.007)*** 
• Eastern 0.556411 0.4578292 
(0.234) (0.000)*** 
• Nairobi 
2.1695113 1.016084 
(0.622) (0.946) 
N. Eastern 
0.5301908 0.528276 
• 
(0.034)** (0.035)** 
3.346637 1.771826 
• Nyanza (0.424) (0.001 )*** 
1.749655 0.9405107 
• Rift Valley (0.558) (0.698) 
0.8206696 0.8932753 
• Western (0.1442) (0.548) 
Summary Statistics: 
Pseudo R2 0.0513 0.0646 0.0753 0.0589 
Prob > chi2 (0.0000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Log likelihood -1403.6381 -1048.8226 -1036.804 -1392.4068 
- --
Note: The p-value of the z statistic (p> I z I) is indicated in parentheses. Statistical significance indicated by *** at 
1 %, ** at 5% and * at 10% conventional levels. The base categories of the dummies are as follows: education 
dummy-no formal schooling, for the region dummy-Central region, age-individuals older than 35 years, gender-
female, settlement type-urban. 
From the results in table 9, we observe that the odds in favour of conflict occurring due to 
income polarisation within regions, variability in income between regions, age, gender, land 
inequality, unemployment, higher education and rural settlement type are all individually 
statistically significant at the 1 % level of significance. Moreover, we find that the odds in favour 
of conflict due to ethnic diversity in four regions (Coast, Eastern, North Eastern, Nyanza) are also 
highly statistically significant at the 1 % level of significance. On the contrary, the odds in favour 
of conflict occurring due to regional attributes, strictly referring to Nairobi, Rift-Valley and 
Western provinces are not statistically significant. The odds ratios depicted in the regression 
results provide a good understanding of the relationship between the dependant variable and 
each explanatory variable. Intuitively, we find that there is a positive relationship between the 
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probability of conflict and polarisation, an individual being male and under 35 years of age, 
land inequality within a region and attaining a higher education. Further, there exists a positive 
relationship between the probability of conflict and regional attribute pertaining to Central, 
Nairobi, Nyanza and Coast provinces. On the other hand, there is a negative relationship 
between the propensity of conflict and income, an individual being unemployed or living in a 
rural area. Another negative association is found between the probability of conflict and ethnic 
diversity in Rift-Valley, Eastern, Western and North Eastern provinces. 
From the regression output of model 1 in table 9, we see that the odds in favour of conflict 
occurring due to income polarisation is statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. To 
a large extent, the observed negative relationship conforms to economic theory and we can 
infer that lower within-group income polarisation provides a strong stimulus for conflict. This is 
explained by Esteban and Ray (2008) who assert that class divisions create groups that display 
strong within-group economic homogeneity and this basis of division provides a potential 
explanation for the probability of conflict. Intuitively, the age, gender and land inequality 
variables are highly statistically significant at the 1 % level of significance and carry the 
expected positive sign according to the literature. In terms of the education variable, we 
observe ambiguous findings in that primary and tertiary education are statistically significant 
relative to no schooling in explaining the odds in favour of conflict, with a higher educational 
attainment bearing a greater statistical significance in explaining a higher probability of 
conflict. Furthermore, we find the odds that an unemployed individual dwelling in a rural area 
will engage in conflict are highly statistically significant and these variables display a negative 
association with the odds in favour of conflict. These findings conform to our expectations due to 
the fact that employment and urbanisation in society fuel greater inequalities which provide a 
strong impetus for conflict. 
Model 2 in table 9 estimates the relationship between the propensity of conflict and group 
variation in income between groups, ceteris paribus. This model reveals that the group-based 
coefficient of variation is not statistically significant in explaining the odds in favour of conflict. 
However, all the other indicators of economic and social inequalities are highly statistically 
significant and conform to our theoretical expectations. Overall, the indicators of conflict are 
jointly highly statistically significant at the 1 % level of significance and tell us that the group-
based variation in income between regions explains the odds in favour of conflict on a 
national level, ceteris paribus. Model 3 extends model 2 by incorporating dummies for the 
region variable. Based on these alterations in the explanatory variables of the model, we 
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attain very intuitive results where the odds in favour of conflict are positive and highly 
statistically significant as a result of income variations between regions, individuals attaining a 
tertiary education relative to no schooling, being under 35 years of age, being a male, being 
unemployed and not living in a rural area. The land inequality variable was dropped at this 
stage owing to collinearity with the other explanatory variables, particularly the region 
dummy variable. Although, we had noted from the second model that land inequality has a 
positive and strong statistical affiliation with the odds in favour of conflict. 
The fourth model that we employ is used to test the contribution of each individual region to the 
probability of conflict. We find that the Coast, Eastern and Nyanza provinces are positively 
related to the probability of conflict at a 1 % statistical significance level, which further 
reinforces our findings from table 8. This model is useful in showing us the regions which are 
more inclined to participate in conflict, in the absence of income inequalities. Ironically, the Coast 
and Nyanza provinces were the least economically developed regions based on 2003 figures 
and exhibited the most divergent social inequalities overall in the sample. The previous analysis 
of figure 3, table2 and table 3 has shown that Nairobi, Rift-Valley and Eastern provinces 
exhibit the greatest income inequalities which validate further the view by Esteban and Ray 
(2008) that ethnic alliances are more predisposed to form in the presence of economic 
inequality. However, it should be noted that this model is relatively weak in testing our 
hypothesis although offers valuable insight. The most robust models are model 1, 2 and 3 which 
show us the relationships of the within-region and between-region income inequalities in 
explaining the odds in favour of conflict. Evidently, these two components playa significant role 
in explaining the odds in favour of conflict where the level of between-group inequalities is 
positively related and highly significantly related to the probability of conflict occurring, yet 
negatively associated to within-group inequalities. This finding corroborates the hypothesis by 
Zhang and Kanbur (1999)4 as explained in chapter 2. From the regression results presented in 
table 9, we can conclude that we reject the null hypothesis that socio-economic inequalities do 
not have a significant impact on the probability of the conflict occurring on a national and 
regional level at the 1 % level of significance. Therefore, we ascertain that socio-economic 
inequalities have a significant influence on the odds in favour of conflict occurring and in the 
presence of divergent levels of income, education, land equality and unemployment; we expect 
a bias towards ethnic conflict in line with the argument by Esteban and Ray (2008). In addition 
4 A more elaborate explanation can be found in the paper by Zhang X., and Kanbur R., 1999 .Which regional 
inequality? The evolution of rural/urban and inland-coastal inequality in China from 1983 to 1995. Journal of 
Economic Papers 50(4): 563-573. 
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to these factors, we also conclude that socio-demographic differences in age and gender also 
playa crucial role in explaining the probability of conflict occurring. On a regional level, we 
observe that ethnic conflict is likely in four main regions namely the Coast, Eastern, Nyanza and 
Rift-Valley provinces, owing to the high levels of socio-economic inequalities in these particular 
regions relative to the other regions. 
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CHAPTER 6: POLICY RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 Policy Recommendation 
These results reinforce key theorists studies on conflict and inequality studies such Esteban and 
Ray (2008) where they conclude that in the presence of economic inequality, there is a logical 
bias towards ethnic conflict. However, these findings are somewhat contrasted by theorists such 
as Lichbach (1989) who provides examples that show limited impact on the inequality-conflict 
link. The contributions by these authors amongst others based on theoretical arguments have 
been empirically motivated in this study, where we observe a positive association between 
conflict potential and the level of between-group inequalities. In the Coast, Eastern, Nyanza and 
Rift-Valley regions we observed stark differences in economic and social inequalities specific to 
these regions in the preceding chapters. On the other hand, we find that there is a statistically 
significant negative relationship between the level of within-group inequalities and the 
probability of conflict. The empirical results provide a close examination of the relative 
importance of addressing these horizontal inequalities coupled with structural cleavages towards 
achieving economic and political stability in Kenya. The notable differences in the relative 
impact of socio-economic inequalities on conflict in Kenya can be justified by the fact that there 
are specific conditions in each province, stemming from the nature of household characteristics. 
The heterogeneous nature of these provinces implies that economic activities and household 
characteristics are inherently diverse. 
In light of this view, a key recommendation for Kenya's policy-makers is to adopt policies which 
reduce rather than increase the salience of identities particularly in these regions which are 
characterised by divergent socio-economic conditions. This can be validated by the fact that 
there is a marked difference between the effect of within-group inequality and between-group 
inequality on the probability of conflict. Thus, these policies should primarily target deprived 
groups which are large in number as opposed to a one-size-fits-all approach for all the eight 
regions which have access to divergent levels of resources. Furthermore, it is important to 
accommodate the extent to the elite are incentivised to mobilisation if too many resources are 
diverted towards the deprived groups leaving a deficit for the privileged. Malaysia and 
Northern Ireland depict two cases that successfully adopted policies towards reducing horizontal 
inequalities and remain relatively peaceful (Langer, Brown & Stewart: 2007). 
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6.2 Conclusion 
A key finding is that the probability of conflict in Kenya is increased by higher income 
inequalities, divergent levels in education, unemployment between groups, demographic 
attributes such as gender and age, settlement area and land inequality. Furthermore, as the 
distribution of resources and income distribution is not uniform across all regions, it has been 
critical to apply the analysis at the regional level which provided us with the benefit of regional 
homogeneity. In this light, we note the sample evidence of the notable differences in the impact 
of horizontal inequalities on the probability of conflict across the Kenyan eight provinces. 
Notably, the conflict models for the Coast, Eastern, Nyanza and Rift-Valley provinces indicate a 
positive association between income distribution, educational and employment strata and socio-
demographic variables and the odds in favour of conflict; which are jointly highly statistically 
significant at the 1 % level of significance. 
Overall, the results provide strong evidence that horizontal inequalities amongst Kenyans, 
particularly social and economic inequalities which capture individuals well-being and societal 
welfare, will affect an individual's propensity to engage in conflict. Ultimately, this results in a 
significant negative impact on economic development and stability if the root causes are not 
dealt with effectively. Although the ethnic divisions formed in Kenya have been deeply 
influenced by its colonial past, it appears that identity based on ethnic background still plays a 
crucial role in the country's evident polarisation providing another channel for conflict. It is clear 
that the link between the level and pattern of social conflict and the distribution of resources is 
positive and if the root causes of conflict are not addressed, one of the leading socioeconomic 
impacts of economic inequality i.e. political conflict will prevail. 
LC 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
REFERENCE LIST 
AFROBAROMETER SURVEY, 2003. Round 3 Afrobarometer Survey in Kenya: 2003 (Data File). 
University of Cape Town, Data First Resource Center. 
ALESINA, A., and DRAZEN, 1991. Why are Stabilizations Delayed? The American Economic 
Review, 81: 1 170- 1 188. 
ALESINA, A., and RODRIK, D., 1994. Distributive Politics & Economic Growth. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 109(2):465-490. 
ACEMOGLU, D., and ROBINSON J.A., 2001. A Theory of Political Transitions. The American 
Economic Review, 91 (4): 938-963. 
APOLLOS, M., 2001. Ethnicity, Violence and Democracy. Africa Development, Vol. XXVI. 
BBC NEWS, 2008. Kenya Rivals Agree To Share Power. [Online] Available: [Accessed 28 
February 2008]. 
BALLENTINE, K., and SHERMAN, J., 2003. The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond 
Greed & Grievance. International Peace Academy, Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
BOOTH, A., 2000. Poverty and Inequality in the Soeharto Era: An Assessment. Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies 36( 1 ):73- 104. 
BRUBAKER, R., AND LAITIN D., 1998. Ethnic and Nationalist Violence. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 24: 423-452. 
CAMERON, L., 2001. Growth with or without equity: the distributional impact of Indonesian 
development. Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, 16(2): 1 - 17. 
CAMPBELL E.H., 2006. Urban Refugees in Nairobi: Problems of Protection, Mechanisms of 
Survival, and Possibilities for Integration, Journal of Refugee Studies, vol 19. 
COLLIER, P., 2000. Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy. A.C 
Checster, F.O Hopson & P. Aall (Eds.), Managing Global Chaos. Washington DC: US Institute of 
Peace and World Bank. 
COLLIER, P., 2001. Implications of Ethnic Diversity. Economic Policy, 16(32): 127-166. 
COLLIER, P., and HOEFFLER A., 1998. On Economic Causes of Civil War. Oxford 
Comparative Economics, 27: 686-701. 
DEY, E.L. 1997. Undergraduate Political Attitudes: Peer Influence in Changing Social Contexts. 
Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 68. 
DOUGHERTY, J., and PHALTZGRAFF, R., 2001. Contending Theorys of International Relations: A 
Comprehensive Survey. 5 th edition, Longman Publishers. 
EAST AFRICA, 2002. Kenya: History: Kenya Colony, Encyclopedia Britannica. 15 ed. 
EASTERLY, W., 2001. The Elusive Quest for Growth, Cambridge,MA, MIT Press. 
L L 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
EASTON D., 1953. The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science. New York: 
Knopf. 
EBATA, M., 2001. Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention in Analysis and Programming: A review of 
CCA/UNDAF processes. [Online] Available: 
www.undp.org!cpr!documents! .. '!CCA and UNDAF Review.doc [Accessed 06 May 2009]. 
ESTEBAN, J.M., and RAY D., 1994. On the Measurement of Polarisation. Econometrica 
estimation. Econometrica, 72(6): 1737-1772. 
ESTEBAN, J and RAY D., 1999. Conflict and Distribution. Journal of Economic Theory, 87:379-
415. 
ESTEBAN, J., and RAY, D., 2008. On the Salience of Ethnic Conflict. American Economic Review, 
98(5):2185-2202. 
FEARON, J.D. and LAITIN, D.D., (2003). "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War" American 
Sociological Review, 97(1 ):75-90. 
FEDDERKE J., and KULARATNE c., Characterizing Conflict Forms. Working Paper No. 
1 06.University of Cape Town and Economic Reseacrh Southern Africa. 
FREEMAN, M., 2008. Kenyan Democracy. The Cape Town Globalist 3(1). May-September 
2008: 18-20. 
GURR T.R., 1970. Sources of rebellion in Western societies: some quantitative evidence. Annals 
of Amer. Academy of Political Science Review 62 (September): 128-144. 
GURR T.R,. and HARFF B., 1994. Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, Westview, Boulder, CO. 
HAGMEYER-GAVERUS, G., 2003. Early Warning Indicator for Preventative Policy - A New 
Approach in Early Warning Research. Working Paper, Stockholm Peace Research Institute. 
HAMILTON, l..c., 2004. Statistics with STATA, version 8. Belmont, CA: Thomson/BrookeCole 
Publishers. 
HOROWITZ, D.l., 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. University of California Press, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, California. 
HOROWITZ, D.l., 2000. The Deadly Ethnic Riot. University of California Press, Berkeley 
in Socially Polarized Economies. Working Staff Paper No. 476, Department of Agricultural and 
Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
KAPFERER, B., 1988. Legends of people, myths of state. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institute 
Press. 
KENYA NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS (KNBS), 2008. Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. 
Ministry of Planning and National Development. [Online] Available: http://www.cbs.go.ke 
[Accessed 14 July 2008]. 
67 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
KENYA POPULATION AND HOUSING CENSUS, 1999. Population and Housing Statistics. Kenya 
National Bureau of Statistics. Ministry of Planning and National Development. [Online] 
Available: http://www.cbs.go.ke [Accessed 14 July 2008]. 
KENYA INTEGRATED HOUSEHOLD BUDGET SURVEY, 2005/2006. Kenya National Bureau of 
Statistics, Ministry of Planning and Natural Development. [Online] Available: 
http://www.cbs.go.ke [Accessed 14 July 2008]. 
KIMENYI, M.S., 1997. Ethnic Diversity, Liberty and the State: The African Dilemma. Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, England. 
KRIESBERG, L., 1998. Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution. Oxford: Rowman 
and littlefield, Inc. 
KUZNETS, S., 1955. Economic Growth and Income Inequality. American Economic Review, 65: 
1-28. 
IRIN, 2009. Kenya: Armed and Dangerous. [Online] Available: 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=76896 [Accessed 22 February 2009]. 
LANGER, A., BROWN, G., and STEWART, F., 2007. Policies Towards Horizontal Inequalities. 
University of Oxford: CRISE Working Paper No.42. 
LASSWELL, H.D., 1935. World politics and personal insecurity. New York: McGraw-HilI. 
LlCHBACH, M. I., 1989. An Evaluation of "Does Economic Inequality Breed Political 
Conflict? Studies. World Politics 41 (4): 431 -470. 
MANCINI, L., 2005. Horizontal Inequality and Communal Violence: Evidence from Indonesian 
Districts. CRISE Working Paper No. 22, University of Oxford. 
MIDLARSKY, M. I. (1988). Rulers and the Ruled: Patterned Inequality and the Onset of Mass 
Political Violence. American Political Science Review, vol. 82 (2), pp. 491-509. 
MOGUES, T., and CARTER, M.R., 2004 .social Capital and the Reproduction of Inequality 
in Socially Polarized Economies, Staff Paper No. 476. Department of Agricultural and 
Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
MONTALVO, J. G., and REYNAL-QUEROL, M., 2005. Ethnic polarization, Political Conflict and 
Civil Wars. American Economic Review, 95(3), 796 -816. 
MOITUI, c., and ISLAM, S., 2008. A Nation's Tragedy Rooted Deep in the Land. The Cape 
Town Globalist 3( 1 }. May-September 2008: 19-20. 
MUIGAI, G., 1995. Ethnicity and the Renewal of Competitive Politics in Kenya: Ethnic Conflict 
and Democratization. Atlanta, GA: The African Studies Association Press. 
NAGEL, J. (197 4). Inequality and discontent: a nonlinear hypothesis. World Politics, 26(4}, 
453-472. 
ODUNDO, E., 2008. The Role of African Securities Markets as Engines for Growth and 
Development. [Online] Available: http://www.rba.go.ke/pdfs/presentation.pdf [Accessed 12 
May 2009]. 
68 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
ONDARI, J., 2009. Down to 1.7%: Can Uhuru Save Kenya? [Online] Available: 
http://www.ngtion.co.ke/News/-/1056/601708/-/view/printVersion/-17tObb/-/index.html 
[Accessed 1 1 May 2009]. 
ORVIS, S., 2001. Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism in Kenya's Virtual Democracy. African 
Issues, 29: 1-2. 
0STBY, G., 2006 Horizontal Inequalities, Political Environment and Civil Conflict: Evidence from 
55 Developing Countries, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity. CRISE: 
Working Paper No. 28. 
OYUGI, W O. (1997), Ethnicity in the Electoral Process: The 1 992 General Elections in Kenya, 
African Journal of Political Science 2, 1: 41-69. 
PERSSON, T., and T ABElLlNl, G., 1992. Growth, Distribution and Politics. The Political Economy 
of Business Cycles and Growth. A.Cukierman, C. Hercowitz, and l. leiderman, (eds). MIT Press, 
Cambridge. 
REYNAl-QUEROl, M. 2002 .Ethnicity, Political Systems and Wars. Journal of Conflict 
ROTHCHilD, D., and SRI RAM, c., 2003. Third Party Incentives and the Phases of Conflict 
Prevention, in From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of 
Violent Conflict. Boulder: lynne Rienner Publishers 
REYNAl-QUEROl M., and MONTALVO J.G., 2002. Why ethnic fractionalization? Polarization, 
ethnic conflict and growth. UPF Working Paper 660. 
ROBERTS, c., 2008. Political instability continues to plague Kenya; News, North Texas Daily. 
[Online] Available: 
http://medig.www.ntdgily.com/medig/storgge/pgper877/news!2008/03/14/News/Politic 
aLinstability.Continues.To.Plague.Kenya-3269386.shtml [Accessed 14 March 2008]. 
ROTHCHilD, D., and SRI RAM, c., 2003. Third Party Incentives and the Phases of Conflict 
Prevention, in From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of 
Violent Conflict. Eds: Chandra lekha Sri ram and Karin Wermester. Boulder: lynne Rienner 
Publishers 
RORTY, R., 1991. Kuznet's Curve: A Typical example of Modernization's "Pseudo-Faustian" 
Development. [Online] Available: http://it.stlgwu.edu/-pomo/mike/kuznet.html[Accessed 30 
March 2009]. 
RUBIN, J, (1994), Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2nd edition, New York: 
McGraw-Hili, Inc., 
SEN, A. K. 1980. Equality of What? In Tanner lectures on Human Values, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
STEWART, F. (2002) Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development. 
STEWART, F., 2007. Addressing Discrimination and Inequality Amongst Groups. [Online] 
Available: http://www.ifpri.org 12020Chinaconference Ipdf Ibeijing brief stewart.pdf. 
[Accessed 12 April 2009]. 
69 
U
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
STEWART, F., BROWN G., and MANCINI, L., 2005.Why Horizontal Inequalities Matter: Some 
Implications for Measurement. CRISE Working Paper No.1 9, Centre for Research on Inequality 
Human Security and Ethnicity, Oxford. 
THE PRS GROUP, 2009. The PRS Group. [Online] Available http://www.prsgroup.com 
[Accessed Accessed 06 June 2009]. 
THORBECKE E., and CHARUMILIND c., 2002. Economic Inequality and its Socioeconomic 
Impact. World Development, 30(9): 1477-1495. 
TILLY, C. (1999) Durable Inequality. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA 
WORLD BANK, 2008. World Development Report. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
ZHANG X., and KANBUR R., 1999 .Which regional inequality? The evolution of rural/urban 
and inland-coastal inequality in China from 1983 to 1995. Journal of Economic Papers 50(4): 
563-573. 
70 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
APPENDICES 
(il Correlation Matrix results for variables used to determine conflict index 
Q25d Q25e Q76 Q41b Q45k Q47 Q7lc 
Q25d 1.0000 
Q25e 0.2700 1.0000 
Q76 0.0764 0.3445 1.0000 
+- -~ 
Q41b -0.0219 -0.0065 -0.005 1.0000 
--
Q45k -0.0565 -0.0657 -0.025 0.1452 1.0000 
~~ f------
Q47 -0.0378 -0.0294 -0.0004 0.1508 0.1062 1.0000 
-- -----
Q71c 0.0558 0.0336 -0.0082 0.1538 0.0278 -0.0024 1.0000 
-----
These variables refer to questions asked as part of the Afro barometer Survey. The respective questions are 
stated below. 
Q25 d: Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether 
you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: 
Used force or violence for a political cause? 
Q25 e: Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, 
personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: 
Attended a demonstration or protest march? 
Q76: Please tell me which of the following statements is closest to your view. Choose Statement A or Statement B. 
A: The use of violence is never justified in Kenyan politics. 
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B: In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause 
Q41 b: In this country, how often: Does competition between political parties lead to conflict? 
Q45k: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you 
heard enough about them to say: Resolving conflicts between communitites? 
Q47: What proportion of the country's problems do you think the government can solve? 
Q71c: In your experience, how often do violent conflicts arise between people: Between different groups in this 
country? 
(ii) Principal Component Analysis Results 
Factor analysis/correlation Number of obs = 2398 
Method: principal-component factors 
Rotation: (unrotated) 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference 
Factor 1 1.50808 0.21187 
Factor 2 1.29621 0.25767 
Factor 3 1.03854 0.13744 
I Factor 4 0.90110 0.01462 
I 
Factor 5 0.88648 0.11333 
Factor 6 0.77314 0.17669 
Factor 7 0.59645 -
Retained factors = 
Number of params = 
Proportion Cumulative 
0.2154 0.2154 
0.1852 0.4006 
0.1484 0.5490 
0.1287 0.6777 
0.1266 0.8043 
--
0.1104 0.9148 
0.0852 1.0000 
LR Test: independent vs saturated: chi2(21) = 695.92 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
(iii) Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
---
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness 
Q25d 0.5733 0.1073 -0.2813 0.5808 
Q25d 0.7893 0.2008 0.1048 0.3257 
Q25e 0.6365 0.1946 0.3856 0.4082 
Q41b -0.1699 0.7144 -0.1193 0.4465 
Q45k -0.2851 0.4910 0.2460 0.6172 
Q47 -0.1991 0.5022 0.4476 0.5078 
Q71c 0.0387 0.4504 -0.7243 0.2710 
(iv) GCOV Calculation 
Region (R) y Yr (Yr-y) (Yr - y)"2 n 
Central 6424.161 6644.878 220.717 48715.994 0.131 
Coast 6424.161 4803.381 -1620.78 2626927.8 0.087 
Eastern 6424.161 5549.778 -874.383 764545.63 0.163 
Nairobi 6424.161 9897.397 3473.236 12063368 0.074 
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219430.4J 0.154 
North 
Eastern 6424.161 6892.595 468.434 
-
Nyanza 6424.161 4042.586 2381.575 5671899.5 0.029 
Rift-Valley 6424.161 7683.445 1259.284 1585796.2 0.243 
31870000 4907980 
31870000 924230 
31870000 7744410 
------ -
150.5625776 
~~--- -- . --- -.--
566.3631986 
456.101885 
I 
j 
1 Western 6424.161 6948.03 523.869 274438.73 0.119 31870000 3792530 146.8336272 ~ 
(v) Change in Land Inequality over Time, all Households, by Province and Nationally, Gini coefficient, 
1996.2005/6 
-._---------
1997 2005/6 Percentage change 
National 0.612 0.832 35.9% 
Nairobi 0.757 0.993 31.1% 
Central 0.546 0.744 36.4% 
Coast 0.500 0.865 73.1% 
Eastern 0.601 0.731 21.6% 
Nyanza 0.475 0.815 71.8% 
Rift Valley 0.642 0.870 35.4% 
Western 0.579 0.769 32.7% 
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